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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL
Although there are numerous entities involved in the primary
SAIC liquidation proceeding, Case No. 920901617, only two
entities are parties to the present appeal:
1.

Golfland Entertainment-Centers, Inc. ("Golfland").

Appellant.
2.

Utah Insurance Commissioner, as Liquidator of Southern

American Insurance Company (the "Liquidator").

Appellee.

RELATED PARTIES
1.

BCD Corporation ("BCD").

At all times relevant to this

dispute, the Liquidator owned and controlled BCD.

Len Stillman,

deputy insurance liquidator, is the President of BCD.
2.

CDX Corporation ("CDX").

At all times relevant to this

dispute, the Liquidator owned and controlled CDX.

Len Stillman,

deputy insurance liquidator, is the President of CDX.
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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter
pursuant Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
A.
1.

2.

3.

Statement of Issues
Is the July 7 Order internally inconsistent?1
(a)

Did the Lower Court adjudicate all claims arising out
of the Barn Contract? or,

(b)

Did the Lower Court rule solely on the issue whether
Golfland is entitled to specific performance on the
sale of the Barn?

Did the Lower Court commit procedural errors?2
(a)

Did the Lower Court usurp the role of the jury by
acting as the finder-of-fact as to disputed factual
issues?

(b)

Did the Lower Court err in finding that "evidence was
submitted with the pleadings"?

(c)

Did the Lower Court err in denying Golfland the right
to a trial - - o r even an evidentiary hearing -- as to
the claims raised against the Liquidator?

Are the Lower Court's factual findings necessary to the
Court's Ruling, or are they merely dicta?3

1

Because the questions surrounding the scope of the Lower
Court's Ruling did not, and could not, arise until after the
Order was entered, this specific issue was not ripe and was
therefore not specifically raised by Golfland in the Court below.
Nevertheless, Golfland did raise the issue generally by arguing
that the Lower Court was prohibited from adjudicating Golfland's
Complaint absent a full jury trial on the merits. (See Record
("R.") at 2551-52).
2

In the Court below, Golfland argued that it was entitled
to a jury and a trial at R. 2551-2552. Golfland argued that no
admissible evidence was submitted with the pleadings at R. 3063.
3

This issue did not become ripe until after the Lower Court
issued its Ruling. Accordingly, Golfland did not specifically
raise this issue in the Court below. Golfland did raise the
issue generally by arguing that there was no admissible evidence
upon which such factual findings could be based. (See R. 3 063).
1

4.

Assuming that admissible evidence was presented to the
Court, are the Court's factual findings supported by the
evidence in the record?4

5.

Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the
Liquidator caused the failure of conditions precedent?5

6.

Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the
Liquidator waived the occurrence of the conditions
precedent?6

7.

Did the Lower Court err in finding that Golfland's tender of
the purchase price was insufficient?7

8.

Did the Lower Court err in failing to consider whether the
Liquidator waived the right to demand a different tender of
the purchase price?8

9.

In determining whether to enforce Judge Stirba's February 24
Order approving the sale of the Barn to Golfland, did the
Lower Court err in failing to apply the "shocks the
conscience" standard?9

10.

Did the Lower Court err in finding that the Barn property is
not "unique" so as to justify a claim for specific
performance?10

4

Golfland argued against the Court's factual findings at R.
2020-2048.
5

This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 029-

2037.
6

This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 03 72045; 2047-2048.
7

This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2 045-

8

This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2047-

9

This argument was raised in the Lower Court at R. 2020-

2048.
2048.
2026.
10

No party raised this issue in the Court below. Rather,
the Lower Court made a finding sua sponte, with no basis
whatsoever in the record to support the finding, that the Barn
property was not "unique" and did not qualify for a claim of
specific performance. This finding was apparently based upon the
Judge's personal experience with the property approximately 20
years ago. (See Part III.A., infra).

B.

Standard of Review
In the present case, all issues on appeal -- both factual

and legal -- are subject to de novo review without according any
deference to the Lower Court, as follows:
Factual Findings:

In this case, the parties dispute whether

there was any admissible evidence upon which factual findings
could be based.

(See Part II. C , infra) . Nevertheless, it is

undisputed that the only evidence in the record, if any, was
submitted in the form of documentation attached to the memoranda
of the parties.

Thus, all factual findings of the Lower Court

are subject to a de novo standard of review.
Because the trial court's finding was based solely
upon . . . written materials and involved no
assessment of witness credibility or competency,
this court is in as good a position as the trial
court to examine the evidence [if any] de novo and
determine the facts.
In re Infant Anonymous, 760 P.2d 916, 918 (Utah App. 1988)).
Accordingly, this Court should give no deference whatsoever to
the purported "factual findings" of the Lower Court.
Legal Findings:

All legal issues on appeal are reviewed

"for correctness, without according deference to the trial
court's legal conclusions."

See Bonham v. Morgan, 788 P.2d 497,

499 (Utah 1989).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES,
REGULATIONS WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE TO ISSUES ON
APPEAL
Golfland submits that the Court's attempt to adjudicate
Golfland's claims without providing a jury trial or even an
evidentiary hearing is a violation of due process and the right

3

to a jury trial guaranteed by the Constitutions of Utah and the
United States.
United States Constitution
Amendment VII. In Suits at common law, where the value in
controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial
by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of the United
States, than according to the rules of the common law.
Amendment XIV, Section 1. All persons born or
naturalized in the United States, and subject to the
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States
and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall
make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United
States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws.
Constitution of Utah
Article I, Section 7. No person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property, without due process of law.
Article I, Section 10. In capital cases the right of trial
by jury shall remain inviolate. In courts of general
jurisdiction, except in capital cases, a jury shall consist
of eight jurors. In courts of inferior jurisdiction a jury
shall consist of four jurors. In criminal cases the verdict
shall be unanimous. In civil cases three-fourths of the
jurors may find a verdict. A jury in civil cases shall be
waived unless demanded.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the July 7, 1995 Order (the "July 7
Order") 11 of Judge Henriod of the Third District Court of Salt
Lake County (the "Lower Court") holding that the Liquidator may
sell certain real property, an office building known as the
"Barn", free and clear of Golfland's specific performance claim.

11

See R. 3131-3136. A true and correct copy of the July 7
Order is contained in the Addendum at pp. 53-58.
4

Golfland initially filed an appeal of the July 7 Order on July
25, 1995.

On December 27, 1996, the Utah Court of Appeals ruled

that the July 7 Order was not a final order and dismissed
Golfland's appeal as premature.

On July 22, 1997, the Lower

Court entered and Order certifying the July 7 Order as final
pursuant to U.R.C.P 54(b).
Procedural and Factual Background
A.

The Liquidation Proceedings
1.

In 1992, the Liquidator was appointed as liquidator of

Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC") pursuant to the Utah
Insurance Code, Utah Code Ann. § 31A-27-101 et. sea.

(See R.

1890 at 1 1 ) .
2.

The SAIC insurance liquidation is governed by the Third

Judicial District Court of Salt Lake County, Case No. 920901617
(the "Lower Court").

Originally, Judge Stirba presided over the

SAIC liquidation proceedings.

Thereafter, Judge Henriod became a

District Judge and was assigned to preside over the liquidation
case.
3.

The present litigation arises solely out of the conduct

of the Liquidator subsequent to the Liquidator's appointment as
liquidator of SAIC.

(See Golfland's Proposed Complaint at R.

1789-1814).
4.

The Liquidator is the owner of the Barn pursuant to its

appointment as liquidator of SAIC.
B.

(See R. 1986 at 1 1 ) .

The February 22 Contract for the Sale of the Barn
5.

On February 22, 1994, pursuant to a judicial auction

and sale -- wherein Golfland was the highest bidder, the
Liquidator and Golfland entered a contract for the sale and
5

purchase of the Barn (the "Barn Contract").

The Barn was to be

sold in conjunction with two other parcels of adjacent property
(the "Water Park" and "Shed") owned by entities controlled by the
Liquidator.12
6.

(See R. 1988-1990 at 11 9-16).

On February 24, 1994, the Liquidation Court (the

Honorable Judge Stirba) entered an Order approving the sale of
the Barn to Golfland pursuant to the Barn Contract (the "February
24 Order").

(See February 24 Order at R. 1534-1542;

See

generally R. 1990 at 1 17).
7.
terms.

The Barn Contract consisted of both written and oral
Three terms are particularly pertinent in the present

appeal:
a.
The "Simultaneous Closing Provision". The
Barn Contract contained a provision requiring that the
sale of the Barn be closed simultaneously with the
closing on the sale of the Water Park and Shed.
b.
The "Timing Provisions". The Barn Contract
contained a provision requiring that closing on the
sale of the Barn was to take place before a certain
date. The Barn Contract also contained a "time is of
the essence" provision.
c.
The "Best Efforts Provision". The Barn
Contract contained a "best efforts" provision wherein
the parties agreed to pursue diligently and use their
best efforts to satisfy the conditions to closing.
(See R. 1990-1992 at 11 19-27).
C.

Golfland's Tender of the Purchase Price
8.

Within two weeks from the date of the auction, Golfland

was prepared to tender its purchase price and complete the sale
of the Barn and related property
Liquidator's performance.
12

CDX.

-- contingent only upon the

The Liquidator, however, was not

The Water Park was owned by BCD.

The Shed was owned by

prepared to close the sale at that time.

Accordingly, the

Liquidator instructed Golfland to deposit its purchase price with
the Title Company until the time that closing could be completed.
The parties arranged to complete the sale on April 8, 1994.

(See

R. 1994 at 1 32; R. 2016-2019 at 11 104-113).
9.

As instructed by the Liquidator, Golfland placed the

entire purchase price ($2,600,000) for the three Seven Peaks
properties with the Title Company.
10.

(See id.).

Because the Liquidator was unable to convey title to

the Title Company, Golfland instructed the Title Company to hold
the purchase price for the benefit of Golfland until further
notice by Golfland.

Golfland sent a copy of its tender

instruction letter to the Liquidator.
11.

(See id.).

The Liquidator raised no objections whatsoever as to

the adequacy of Golfland's tender.

Indeed, on several occasions

thereafter, the Liquidator represented that Golfland's tender was
wholly sufficient and that Golfland had done "all that they had
to do."
D.

(See id.) .

The Liquidator Causes Conditions Precedent to Fail
12.

Thereafter, the Liquidator, through neglect and

intentional conduct, pursued a course of action which caused
conditions precedent in the Barn Contract to fail.

Specifically,

the Liquidator neglected to obtain court approval for the sale of
the Water Park which was sufficient to withstand a legal
challenge brought by an unsuccessful bidder.13
13

The Liquidator

Peak Investments, Inc. ("Peak"), an unsuccessful bidder
at the auction, filed a motion challenging the Court's approval
of the sale of the Water Park. Subsequently, Peak prevailed on
its motion and the Bankruptcy Court's approval of the sale of the
7

knew, or should have known that additional court approval would
be needed in light of the fact that the parties had entered a new
agreement designed to supplement the previous contract for the
sale of the Water Park.

The Liquidator also engaged in secret

negotiations, double dealing, and misrepresentations which caused
the unsuccessful bidder to file its legal challenge to the sale
of the Water Park.
E.

(See R. 1997-1999 at M

45-49) .14

Failure to Close on the Sale of the Barn
13.

Because of the legal challenge pending against the

Water Park, the Liquidator was unable to obtain title insurance
for the Water Park and was unable to close the sale of the Water
Park at the April 8, 1994 scheduled closing.

(See R. 2003 at HH

56-57).
14.

Under the Simultaneous Closing Provision of the Barn

contract, the sale of the Barn could not close because of the
failure to close on the Water Park.
F.

(See id.).

Subsequent Arrangements to Complete the Sale of the Barn
15.

On April 8, 1994, the Liquidator waived the Timing

Provisions of the Barn Contract and indicated that,
notwithstanding the Timing Provisions, the parties would work
together to obtain proper court approval and title insurance

Water Park was withdrawn.
14

Obviously, the Liquidator disputes some of Golfland's
factual allegations. Nevertheless, Golfland submits that for
purposes of this appeal, all allegations in Golfland's Complaint
should be deemed as true. Golfland has not been given an
evidentiary hearing in which to adjudicate these allegations.
Until and unless Golfland is given a jury trial on these issues,
such allegations should be viewed in a light most favorable to
Golfland.
8

necessary so that the sale of the three properties could be
completed simultaneously.
16.

(See R. 2003-2006 at H1 58-63).

Subsequently, when it became apparent that Court

approval for the sale of the Water Park would not be immediately
forthcoming, the Liquidator waived the Simultaneous Closing
Provision and indicated a willingness to complete the sale of the
Barn to Golfland independent from the Water Park.

(See R. 2 015

at 1M 98-99).
17.

Thereafter, on multiple occasions, the Liquidator

indicated expressly and impliedly that it was willing to complete
the sale of the Barn to Golfland pursuant to the Barn Contract.
(See id.).
G.

The Liquidator Breaches the Barn Contract
18.

Notwithstanding its obligations and promises to

Golfland, the Liquidator then proceeded, without Golfland's
knowledge or consent, to solicit other offers from Provo City,
and others, in an attempt to obtain more money on the sale of the
Barn Property.
19.

(See R. 2015 at H 101).

Shortly thereafter, the Liquidator received an offer

from Provo City to purchase the Barn for more money than the
Golfland purchase price.

As a result, the Liquidator determined

that it would repudiate the Barn Contract with Golfland and offer
the Barn for sale again to the highest bidder.

(See R. 2015-2016

at UK 101-102).
20.

Accordingly, the Liquidator rebuffed Golfland's attempt

to complete the sale of the Barn independent from the Water Park.
(See id.).

9

21.

After receiving the higher Provo City offer, the

Liquidator did an about-face as to the legal and factual issues
surrounding Golfland's right to purchase the Barn.

Thereafter,

the Liquidator argued for the first time that Golfland had
defaulted under the Barn Contract and had lost all rights to
purchase the Barn when it tendered its purchase price in March,
1994.

The Liquidator also argued that, pursuant to the

Simultaneous Closing Provision and the Timing Provisions,
Golfland lost all rights to purchase the Barn when the sale
failed to close on April 8, 1994.

These new arguments were

wholly inconsistent with the conduct and representations of the
Liquidator in the weeks and months preceding the receipt of the
Provo City offer.
H.

(See R. 2016-2019 at UK 104-113) .

Golfland Prepares a Complaint Against the Liquidator
22.

In July and August, 1994, Golfland prepared a Complaint

against the Liquidator (the "Proposed Complaint"), asserting that
the Liquidator was still obligated to sell the Barn to Golfland
notwithstanding the non-occurrence of conditions precedent.
Pursuant to the Proposed Complaint, Golfland took the position
that the Liquidator is liable for specific performance and
monetary damages for the injuries suffered by Golfland as a
result of the Liquidator's breach of contract and other tortious
conduct.
23.

(See Proposed Complaint at R. 1789-1814).
Because the Liquidator is protected by the Utah

Insurance Code and the Order of Liquidation, Golfland felt

10

compelled to seek leave of the Lower Court to file its Proposed
Complaint against the Liquidator.15
24.

(See R. 1779-1781).

On August 11, 1994, Golfland filed a Motion seeking

leave of Court to file its Proposed Complaint (Golfland's "Motion
for Leave to File Complaint") .
25.

(See id.) .

Shortly thereafter, the Liquidator filed a motion

seeking Court permission to sell the Barn to Provo City or
another offeror

(The Liquidator's "Motion to Sell Barn").

(See

R. 1815-1818).
26.

In briefing the two pending Motions, each party

attached a few documents as exhibits to the memoranda.

However,

neither party attempted to lay a foundation for the exhibits, or
to otherwise establish the admissibility of such documents.
party filed any affidavits in support of their memoranda.

No

No

discovery was conducted.
I,

The Liquidator's Position in the Court Below
27.

The Liquidator unashamedly opposed Golfland's Motion

for Leave to File Complaint.

the position
any trial
Liquidator.
be allowed

that Golfland
-- to adjudicate
The Liquidator
to file

its

Unbelievably,

the

Liquidator

should not be given a jury

trial

Golfland's

the

claims against

argued that Golfland

Complaint.

should not

took

—or

even

Instead, the Liquidator

argued, all of Golfland's claims should be resolved by the
15

It is uncertain whether Golfland was required to obtain
leave of Court to file its Complaint. The Utah Insurance Code
does not appear to apply to situations where, as here, claims are
brought against the Liquidator for its own post-liquidation
conduct -- rather than claims brought against the insurance
company for pre-liquidation conduct. Nevertheless, out of an
abundance of caution, Golfland decided that it would seek Court
permission prior to filing its Complaint.
11

Liquidation Court pursuant to the Liquidator's Motion to Sell
Barn.

(See R. 1888).
28.

The Liquidator's Motion to Sell Barn consisted of two

prongs:
(a) First, the Liquidator requested a Court Order allowing
the Liquidator to sell the Barn to Provo City or any other
higher and better offeror notwithstanding the February 22
Barn Contract with Golfland (the Liquidator's "Primary
Motion").
(b) Second, in the alternative, the Liquidator requested,
if the Court determined that the Liquidator was obligated to
sell the Barn to Golfland under the February 22 Barn
Contract, that the Court enter an Order approving the
completion of the sale to Golfland (the Liquidator's
"Alternative Motion").
(See R. 1815-1816).
29.

In briefing the two motions, the Liquidator for the

first time raised its arguments that Golfland lost the right to
purchase the Barn because of insufficient tender and the failure
of conditions.
J.

(See % 21, supra).

Golfland's Position in the Court Below
30.

Golfland argued in opposition to the Primary Motion and

in support of the Alternative Motion.
31.

(See R. 1985-1986) .

In arguing against the Liquidator's Primary Motion,

Golfland argued that the Liquidator was bound, under the February
22 Barn Contract and the February 24 Order, to sell the Barn to
Golfland.

Golfland argued that, even if there was a failure of

certain conditions and contingencies under the contract, the
Liquidator could not escape liability, because:

(1) the

Liquidator breached the "best efforts" provision of the Barn
Contract; (2) the Liquidator, through representations, omissions,
and other conduct, improperly caused the conditions to fail; and
12

(3) the Liquidator waived the right to enforce such conditions.
(See R. 2026-2048).
32.

In its memoranda, Golfland argued that the Primary

Motion could not properly be granted "until after a full jury
trial on the merits" of Golfland's proposed Complaint was
conducted.

(See R. 2551-2552).

33.

However, in arguing in favor of the Liquidator's

Alternative Motion, Golfland argued that no additional
adjudication was necessary to support an Order approving the sale
of the Barn to Golfland.
K.

(See R. 2552-2553) .

The April 17 Hearing
34.

On April 17, 1995, oral argument was held on Golfland's

Motion for Leave to File Complaint and the Liquidator's Motion to
Sell Barn.

No evidence whatsoever was admitted at the hearing.

(A copy of the transcript of the April 17, 1995 Hearing is
attached in the Addendum, at pp. 1-52) .
35.

At the close of the oral argument, the Court granted

the Liquidator's Primary Motion -- ruling that the Liquidator may
sell the Barn to another offeror free and clear of Golfland's
interest.

The Court also granted Golfland's Motion for Leave to

File Complaint -- ruling that Golfland would be permitted to seek
monetary damages by filing a Complaint against the Liquidator in
State court.

(The transcript of the Court's Ruling is attached

in the Addendum at pp. 46-52) .
36.

At the hearing, to Golfland's surprise and without a

request by any party, the Liquidation Judge made specific
findings,

factual

as an apparent finder of fact, in support of its ruling

approving the Liquidator's Primary Motion -- notwithstanding the
13

lack of any admissible evidence before the Court.

(See Addendum

p. 48, 11. 4-16; p. 49, 11. 12-15).
37.

Golfland was particularly surprised when the

Liquidation Judge made the following finding:
I do not think this real estate is so unique that
dollar damages in the event you're successful with
the complaint would not be satisfactory and
sufficient.
(See Addendum, p.49, 11. 12-15).

The Liquidator made this

finding notwithstanding the fact that the parties had presented
no evidence, documentation, or argument whatsoever as to this
issue.

This finding was apparently based upon the Liquidation

Judge's personal experience with the Barn.

Immediately prior to

making this finding, the Liquidation Judge noted: "I think I
foreclosed on this same property once back in the late 70's . . .
(See Addendum p. 49, 11. 8-10).
L.

The Barn Litigation
38.

Pursuant to the Court's Order, Golfland filed its

Complaint against the Liquidator in State Court on June 22, 1995,
Case No. 950904413CV (the "Barn Litigation").
39.

On July 31, 1995, the Liquidator filed a motion to

dismiss the Barn Litigation.

Notwithstanding the Lower Court's

Order allowing Golfland to seek monetary damages by filing its
Complaint, the Liquidator argues that the Lower Court's ruling at
the April 17 Hearing operates as full adjudication of all of the
claims raised in Golfland's Complaint and, under the doctrines of
res judicata, precludes the Barn Litigation in its entirety.
(See Liquidator's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss
Complaint, at pp. 6-17

(attached as Exhibit "H" to Golfland's
14

Memorandum in Opposition to Appellee's Motion for Summary
Disposition, filed in this Appeal on October 9, 1997) ) . 1 6
40.

In other words, the Liquidator asserts that Golfland

has no right to a jury trial on any of its claims -- whether for
specific performance or monetary damages.

Instead, the

Liquidator asserts, all of Golfland's claims were adjudicated by
the Judge pursuant to oral argument at the April 17 Hearing.
(See id.).
M.

The July 7 Order
41.

After the April 17 Hearing, a dispute arose as to the

form of the Court Order granting the Liquidator's Motion to Sell
Barn.

Specifically, the parties disputed whether the Court's

ruling was based upon an evidentiary record.

(See R. 2933-2958;

2959-2993; 3062-3072).
42.

Ultimately, on July 7, 1995, the Court entered the July

7 Order granting the Liquidator's Primary Motion.

(See Addendum,

at pp. 53-58).
43.

The July 7 Order contained the following language: "No

evidence was taken at the hearing; evidence was submitted with
the pleadings."
N.

(See R. 3132).

The Present Appeal
44.

After the July 7 Order was certified as final, Golfland

appealed the July 7 Order by initiating the present appeal with
the Utah Supreme Court.

16

Although the Liquidator filed its Motion to Dismiss on
July 31, 1995, Judge Henriod has not yet issued a ruling on the
Liquidator's Motion.
15

45.

On October 8, 1997, the Utah Supreme Court assigned the

appeal to the Utah Court of Appeals.
46.

Pursuant to Golfland's appeal, Golfland filed a

Docketing Statement listing several separate issues on appeal.
(See Docketing Statement, at pp. 5-8).
47.

Thereafter, the Liquidator filed a Motion for Summary

Disposition arguing that Golfland had failed to raise the issues
on appeal in the Lower Court.
48.

Golfland filed a memorandum in opposition to the

Liquidator's Motion.

Golfland's memorandum pinpointed specific

cites in the record where Golfland had raised each of the
arguments below.
49.

On October 23, 1997, the Utah Court of Appeals issued

an Order denying the Liquidator's Motion for Summary Disposition.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
On February 22, 1994, Golfland and the Liquidator entered a
contract for the purchase of the Barn.

Thereafter, the

Liquidator breached its contractual obligation toward Golfland
and attempted to sell the Barn to Provo City for more money.
When Golfland prepared a Complaint against the Liquidator for
breach of contract, the Liquidator attempted to use his status as
a state insurance liquidator to deprive Golfland of its right to
a trial on the contract claims.

Specifically, the Liquidator has

taken the position that the Liquidation Court should not permit
Golfland to file its Complaint and that the Court should
adjudicate Golfland's claims itself without allowing a trial or
evidentiary hearing.
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The Lower Court erred when it granted the Liquidator's
motion to sell the Barn to Provo City.
Order is internally inconsistent.

First, the Court's July 7

The factual findings in the

Order cannot be reconciled with the Court's ruling -- unless most
of the factual findings are considered to be dicta.
Second, the Lower Court committed serious procedural errors
because: (1) the Court adjudicated factual issues itself rather
than allowing a jury to make factual determinations; (2) there
was no admissible evidence upon which factual findings could be
based; and (3) the Court failed to give Golfland an opportunity
to present its evidence at a trial or evidentiary hearing.
Third, the Lower Court's findings are contrary to law and
are not supported by the evidence in the record (if any).
Specifically, the Court's finding that the Barn is not "unique"
so as to justify a claim for specific performance is not
supported by any evidence whatsoever and is contrary to Utah
property law.

Next, the Court's finding that the February 24

Order is invalid is contrary to substantial case law protecting
the validity of judicial sales.

Finally, the Court's ruling that

the Barn Contract is not enforceable because of the failure of
conditions is erroneous because the Liquidator caused the
conditions to fail and/or because the Liquidator waived the right
to enforce such conditions.
ARGUMENT
I.

The Lower Courts Ruling is Inconsistent and Fundamentally
Flawed
The Lower Court's Ruling can be interpreted in two different

ways:
17

Interpretation No. 1:

Complete Adjudication of All Claims.

Under this interpretation, it is argued that the Lower
Court intended to adjudicate all claims arising out of the
Barn Contract. That is, that the Court in essence sat as
judge and jury -- as if a trial had been held -- and
adjudicated the entire dispute, including claims for
monetary damages and specific performance.
Interpretation No. 2:

Adjudication of the "Specific
Performance Claim" Only.

Under this interpretation, it is argued that the Lower
Court's ruling was limited to a denial of Golfland's
specific performance claim. That is, the Court found that
the Barn could be sold to a third-party purchaser and that
Golfland had no right to actual possession or ownership of
the real estate. As to the remaining issues in Golfland's
Complaint, however, the Court made no adjudication. Rather
the Court specifically provided that Golfland may file its
Complaint and pursue its claims for monetary damages against
the Liquidator.17
At times in the past, the Liquidator has taken inconsistent
positions with respect to the proper interpretation -alternating arguments in favor of both interpretations.
Originally, in the Court below, the Liquidator argued in
favor of Interpretation No. 1.

In its initial memorandum, the

Liquidator argued:
Resolution of the Liquidator's Motion resolves all
of Golfland's proposed claims against the
Liquidator. Therefore there is no need to grant
relief to allow the filing of such a lawsuit.
(R. 1888).

Thus, the Liquidator originally took the position

that the Court could render complete adjudication as to all
claims without allowing Golfland's Proposed Complaint to be
filed.
17

Under this interpretation, the Court's actions were
similar to that of a Bankruptcy Court, which allows that property
be sold pending a dispute between parties. The property is
allowed to be sold to a third-party purchaser free and clear of
liens and interests. The claimant's rights in the property, if
any, attach to the proceeds of the sale.
18

Later, however, the Liquidator argued that its motion was
limited to the issue of specific performance only:
The sole issue before this court is whether to
require [the Liquidator] to proceed with the sale
of [the Barn] . . . [to Golfland] or to approve
the sale of the SAIC Barn to a higher and better
offeror.
See Liquidator's October 4, 1994 Reply Memorandum in Support of
Motion to Sell Barn, at p. 1 (emphasis added).
More recently, the Liquidator has switched positions again
and argues that the April 17 ruling was intended to be a complete
adjudication of all claims arising out of the Barn contract -including claims for monetary damages.

(See %% 39-40, supra).

There are significant problems and inconsistencies with the
Liquidator's "all claims adjudicated" interpretation
(Interpretation No. 1 ) . A review of the Court's Ruling at the
April 17 Hearing reveals that the Court did not intend, and could
not have intended, that its Ruling be a complete adjudication of
the claims asserted in Golfland's Proposed Complaint.
Immediately after granting the Liquidator's Primary Motion to
sell the Barn to Provo City, the Court granted Golfland's motion
for leave to file the Proposed Complaint against the Liquidator.
Furthermore, the Court specifically noted that Golfland would be
allowed to pursue its claims for monetary damages against the
Liquidator.

(See Addendum, at p. 49, 11.12-16).

These actions are wholly inconsistent with an intent to
adjudicate all of the claims contained in Golfland's Complaint.
If the Court intended that its ruling be a complete adjudication,
why did it grant Golfland's Motion for Leave to File the
Complaint?

Why did it specifically say that Golfland would be
19

allowed to pursue a claim for monetary damages against the
Liquidator?

Clearly, the Court's action in this regard suggests

that no complete adjudication was intended.
There are other problems with the "complete adjudication"
interpretation as well.

Such an interpretation would deprive

Golfland of its constitutional right to due process and a jury
trial on its entire Complaint.

One of the primary purposes for

the April 17 Hearing was for the Court to consider Golfland's
motion and determine whether Golfland would be granted leave to
file its Proposed Complaint against the Liquidator. In such
circumstances, it would be procedurally and constitutionally
improper for the Court to attempt to adjudicate the entire
Complaint in that setting.

Did the Court really intend that --

in connection with a short oral argument -- it would adjudicate
the entire Complaint thus obviating the need for filing of the
Complaint?

Did the Court intend to do away with the ordinary

litigation process -- including the filing of pleadings, the
discovery process, and trial?
Clearly, the answer to these questions is no.

The Lower

Court did not intend, and could not have intended, that its
ruling be a complete adjudication of the claims contained in
Golfland's Complaint.
sense.

Interpretation No. 1 simply does not make

It is fatally flawed because of irreconcilable internal

inconsistencies.
Admittedly, there are problems with the "specific
performance only" interpretation (Interpretation No. 2 ) .
Specifically, if the Court intended to rule solely on the issue
of specific performance, why was it necessary to make factual
20

findings as to the enforceability of the contract?

Why did the

Court make factual findings as to the failure of conditions
precedent and the sufficiency of Golfland's tender?

Such

findings would not be necessary to adjudicate the simple question
of specific performance.
Despite its problems, Interpretation No. 2 suffers from
substantially fewer deficiencies than Interpretation No. 1.

This

interpretation is the only way to reconcile the Court's
simultaneous granting of Golfland's Motion for Leave to File the
Complaint and the Court's statement that Golfland would be
allowed to pursue its claim for monetary damages.

Furthermore,

this interpretation lessens the impact of the serious
constitutional and procedural concerns in the Court below.
Moreover, if those factual findings which are not necessary to
the Court's Ruling are considered to be dicta,18 there are no
internal inconsistencies in this interpretation.
Regardless of the interpretation employed by the Court,
Golfland submits that the July 7 Order is erroneous as a matter
of fact and law.19

Nevertheless, should this Court be inclined

to uphold the July 7 Order, it should clarify that the Order is

18

See n.23, infra.

19

Under either interpretation, the July 7 Order is
deficient because of procedural errors. See Part II, infra.
Specifically, the Order violated Golfland's constitutional rights
to due process and a jury trial. Furthermore, Interpretation No.
1 is erroneous because it is based upon flawed legal and factual
findings as to the failure of conditions precedent, the
sufficiency of Golfland's tender, and the validity of the
February 24 Order. (See Part III, infra). Interpretation No. 2
is erroneous because it is based upon clearly erroneous legal and
factual findings as to the "uniqueness" of the Barn property.
(See Part III.A., infra).
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limited to the issue of specific performance and that it does not
purport to adjudicate any issues relevant to Golfland's claim for
monetary damages in the Barn Litigation.
II.

Procedural Errors
The most glaring errors committed by the Lower Court were

procedural.

As a result of these errors, Golfland has been

deprived of its constitutional rights to due process and a jury
trial.

Indeed, Golfland has been deprived of the right to any

trial -- or even an evidentiary hearing.

Instead, the Lower

Court purported to adjudicate Golfland's rights on its own, based
solely upon the oral argument of counsel and a few exhibits which
were attached (not in admissible form) to the memoranda.
A*

Background

At the April 17 Hearing, the Cower Court considered three
(3) separate motions:
1.

Golfland's Motion for Leave to File Complaint;

2.

The Liquidator's Primary Motion seeking leave of the
Court to sell the Barn to Provo City; and

3.

The Liquidator's Alternative Motion seeking leave of
the Court to complete the sale of the Barn to Golfland.

The resolution of the first and third motions did not
require an evidentiary hearing or any admissible evidence
whatsoever.

Golfland's Motion for Leave to File Complaint was

essentially a precautionary motion to avoid violating any stay
which may be in place as to lawsuits against the Liquidator.
Golfland was not seeking any dispositive ruling on the issues
raised in the Complaint, but just the right to file the Complaint
to initiate the process of a determination of the Liquidator's
liability for post-liquidation conduct.
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It was not necessary or

appropriate for the Court to conduct a trial or to consider
evidence in order to grant Golfland's motion.
Similarly, with respect to the Liquidator's Alternative
Motion to sell the Barn to Golfland, no evidence was necessary.
The Liquidation Court had previously entered the February 24
Order approving the sale of the Barn to Golfland.

The Lower

Court could certainly enforce that Order, without requiring an
evidentiary hearing, by simply modifying the specific closing
provisions.
With respect to the Liquidator's Primary Motion (seeking
leave to sell the barn to Provo City), however, a full
evidentiary trial was absolutely critical.

Because the sale to

Provo City would necessitate a vacation of the February 24 Order
approving the sale to Golfland, and because it would require an
adjudication of the specific performance claim contained in
Golfland's Proposed Complaint, the Primary Motion could not
properly be granted absent a full jury trial on the merits of
Golfland's breach of contract claim.20
In its Ruling, the Court committed gross procedural error
because it purported to grant the Primary Motion without giving
Golfland the benefit of a trial.

20

Thus, in its memorandum, Golfland argued the following:
[T]he sale to Provo City cannot be approved
absent full adjudication of the rights of the
parties under the contract for the sale of
the barn property to Golfland. . . . This

court cannot approve the sale
until after a full jury trial
has been conducted.
(See R. 2552-52 (emphasis added)).
23

to Provo City
on the merits

B.

The Lower Court Usurped the Role of the Jury by Acting
as the Finder-of-Fact

Ordinarily, when a seller breaches a contract for the sale
of real property, the would-be purchaser is entitled to file a
Complaint against the seller for breach of contract -- seeking
both damages and specific performance.

In such a situation,

pursuant to the Constitutions of the United States and Utah, the
purchaser has the right to have its claims resolved by a jury of
its peers, rather than the Court.
In the present case, Golfland was deprived of this
constitutional right.

Instead, the Court usurped the jury's role

and, at the conclusion of oral argument, made specific findings
of fact —

as if the Court, rather than the jury, were the proper

adjudicator of such facts.
The Court's actions in this respect are erroneous on their
face.

Nowhere is the Court authorized to act as the finder-of-

fact on a claim for breach of contract.

The fact that this case

involves the liquidation of an insurance company does not alter
this analysis.

The Utah Insurance Code does not, and cannot,

subvert the plaintiff's constitutional right to a jury trial.
For this reason alone, the Order of the Lower Court should
be reversed and remanded with instructions that Golfland be given
a jury trial on the question whether the Liquidator is obligated
to complete the sale of the Barn to Golfland.
C.

The Lower Court Erred in Finding that "Evidence was
Submitted with the Pleadings,"

At the conclusion of oral argument, the Lower Court made
specific factual findings -- as if the court had just sat through
a trial or an evidentiary hearing.
24

Such findings were surprising

in light of the fact that there had been

hearing
findings

and there was no admissible

no trial

evidence

or

evidentiary

upon which

factual

could be based.

Later, when the this clear deficiency was brought to the
Liquidator's attention, the Liquidator insisted that the
following sentence be added to its Second Proposed Order:
fl

[E]vidence was submitted with the pleadings."21

was included in the July 7 Order.

This language

(See R. 3132).

This sentence is inaccurate, misleading, and erroneous as a
matter of law.

In the proceedings below, no party submitted or

even attempted to submit any admissible evidence to the Court.
Although the parties attached a few documents as exhibits to
their memoranda, none of the exhibits was supported by any
affidavit or otherwise submitted in admissible form.
Because it cannot be reasonably disputed that there was no
admissible

evidence attached to the memoranda, the Lower Court's

July 7 Order is clearly erroneous and should be reversed.
D5

The Lower Court Erred in Failing to Provide Golfland
with a Trial - - o r Even an Evidentiary Hearing - - i n
Which to Litigate its Claims Against the Liquidator

Not only was Golfland deprived of a jury, it was deprived of
its right to a trial altogether.

21

Indeed, the Lower Court did not

The Liquidator included this language in an after-thefact attempt to salvage the Lower Court's blatant procedural
error. Because it could not be disputed that there was no trial
or evidentiary hearing to support factual findings, the
Liquidator for the first time took the position that the
documents attached as exhibits to the memoranda were evidence
upon which the findings were based. Prior to this time, neither
the Court nor any party had ever indicated that the exhibits were
to be considered as "evidence."
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even allow Golfland an evidentiary hearing in which to assert its
claims against the Liquidator.
It is undisputed that in the proceedings below, the court
held no trial.

It is undisputed that the court held no

evidentiary hearing.

Rather, the only hearing that was held was

one for the oral argument of counsel on the two pending motions.
It is undisputed that no evidence was submitted at this
hearing.22

Golfland was not allowed to opportunity to examine,

or cross-examine any witnesses.
Thus, even if admissible evidence were submitted with the
pleadings, there is no denying the fact that Golfland was denied
the opportunity to present its evidence at a trial or evidentiary
hearing.
Ill, Substantive Errors
The July 7 Order should be reversed because it is based upon
erroneous legal conclusions and factual findings.

Such errors

are independent from the Court's procedural errors.

Thus, even

if there were admissible evidence in the record, the Court's
finding are erroneous because they are not supported by such

evidence.

Indeed,

be assumed that all

for purposes

of the documents attached

memoranda are admissible
in making

factual

of Part III

findings.

evidence

of this

Brief,

as exhibits

it may
to

upon which the Court could

the
rely

As shown below, such evidence is

wholly insufficient to support the Court's factual findings.
At the close of the April 17 Hearing, the Lower Court ruled
from the bench making several findings of fact.
22

These findings

Indeed, the July 7 Order itself states that: "No evidence
was taken at the hearing . . . ." (See Addendum, at p. 54).
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were later incorporated into six separate factual findings in the
Court's written July 7 Order.
M

2-7) .
A.

(See July 7 Order, R. 3132-3133 at

This brief will discuss each of these findings in turn.
The "Uniqueness" of the Barn

The Lower Court's most glaring factual error is its finding
that :
The SAIC Barn is not so unique that dollar damages
in the event that Golfland is successful in its
complaint against the Liquidation Estate would not
be satisfactory and sufficient.
(See R. 3133 at % 7), 2 3

This finding is clearly erroneous

because there is absolutely nothing in the record which would
support such a finding.

The record contains no documentation,

memoranda, or argument of counsel as to this issue.

The question

whether the Barn is "unique" so as to justify a claim for
specific performance was not raised whatsoever in the proceedings
before the Lower Court.

Rather, the Lower Court sua sponte

raised the issue in its Ruling at the April 17 Hearing.
The Lower Court's finding is apparently based upon Judge
Henriod's own prior experience with the property.

Immediately

prior to making the finding, the Judge commented that he had

23

Of the Lower Court's six findings, this finding is the
only one necessary to the Court's Ruling. Indeed, the Court's
Ruling -- that the Liquidator would be allowed to sell the Barn
free from Golfland's specific performance claim - - i s based
directly upon the finding that the Barn is not unique and does
not justify a claim for specific performance.
The other five findings made by the Court are inconsistent
with the Court's Ruling that Golfland would be allowed to pursue
its claim for monetary damages against the Liquidator. Thus, if
the Lower Court intended to limit its Ruling to Golfland's
specific performance claim (see Interpretation No. 2, supra),
then the remaining five findings are dicta and need not be
considered by this Court.
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foreclosed on the same property in the 1970's.

Specifically, the

Judge stated:
I think I foreclosed on this same property once back in
the late '70's, so go ahead and conduct your sale. I
am also going to grant Golfland's motion, though, to
file a complaint, and I do not think that this real
estate is so unique that dollar damages in the event
that you're successful with the complaint would not be
satisfactory and sufficient.
(Addendum, p.49, 11. 8-15).
Because of the utter lack of evidence or argument as to
whether the real property is "unique," the Judge's sua sponte
finding as to this issue must have been based upon his own
personal experience with the Barn property.

As a matter of law,

this is an insufficient basis for a factual finding.

The Judge's

alleged personal experience is, on its face, an improper basis
for making a factual finding on the record.24
Furthermore, the Court's finding is contrary to the true
facts of this case.

Although such facts are not in the record,

Golfland submits that the true evidence would show that, based on
the architecture, location, and other aspects of the Barn, the
Barn property with its improvements is extremely unique.
Golfland is uncertain as to the condition of the real property
when Judge Henriod foreclosed on it in the 1970's.

At the

present, however, the real property contains a successful office
building with a unique location at the foot of a majestic
mountain and adjacent to two major recreational attractions.

24

It is impossible to "marshal the evidence" in support of
this finding because there was absolutely no evidence in the
record whatsoever upon which such a finding could be made.
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Moreover, regardless of the factual record, the Court's
finding that the Barn is not "unique" is contrary to law.
Pursuant to relevant law, all real estate is "unique" so as to
qualify for specific performance.

Under Utah law, specific

performance is a valid remedy for breach of a contract for the
sale of land.

(See Kelley v. Leucadia Financial Corp., 846 P.2d

1238, 1242 (Utah 1992) ("Specific performance with an abatement
in purchase price has long been recognized as an appropriate
remedy when the seller refuses to convey")).

The law does not

provide for a case-by-case, factual determination as to whether a
given parcel of real estate is unique.
that all real property is unique.

Rather, the law presumes

By its very nature, real

property is unique so as to justify specific performance.

See

Perron v. Hale, 701 P.2d 198, 202 (Idaho 1985) ("because of the
perceived uniqueness of land, it is presumed that damages are
inadequate in an action for breach of a land sale contract").
See also Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah App. 1987);
Castaano v. Church, 552 P.2d 1282, 1284 (Utah 1976).
Thus, in the present case, it was neither necessary nor
proper for the Lower Court to make a factual finding as to the
uniqueness of the Barn.

Under Utah law, the Court should have

deemed the property to be unique, sufficient to allow Golfland to
pursue its claim for specific performance on the Barn Contract.
B.

The Validity of Judge Stirba's February 24 Order

In its fifth factual finding, the Lower Court found:
Judge Stirba's February 24 1994, Order authorizing the
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective
because the terms of sale that Judge Stirba approved in
her Order were not the terms of the sale that was
frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court Order.
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R. 3133 at H 6.25
The Lower Court's casual disregard for Judge Stirba's prior
court Order approving the sale to Golfland exhibits a complete
misunderstanding of the strict legal standard governing the
validity of a confirmed judicial sale.

The Lower Court has

failed to acknowledge that confirmed judicial sales should not be
set aside lightly.

The law provides that a confirmed judicial

sale is entitled to special judicial protection.

In order to

protect the sanctity of the judicial sale process, courts will
not allow a confirmed judicial sale to be disturbed absent
egregious misconduct.

Courts apply a strict legal standard in

order to protect purchasers at judicial sales.

Application of

the strict standard is designed to prevent situations (as in the
present case) where the seller is able to revoke the sale in
order to gain more money from a subsequent offeror.
The Utah Supreme Court has explained that:

"The policy of

the courts is to uphold judicial sales except when they are
manifestly

unfair."

Mower v. Bohmke, 337 P.2d 429, 431 (Utah

1959) (emphasis added).
Numerous courts throughout the United States have applied a
strict legal standard in determining whether to disturb the
integrity of judicial sales.

Many courts require that there be

sufficient misconduct to "shock the conscience" of the Court.

25

As discussed in n.23, supra, this finding (as well as all
remaining findings) is not necessary for the Court's Ruling that
the Liquidator is permitted to sell the Barn free from Golfland 7 s
specific performance claim. Accordingly, if this Court rules
that the July 7 Order adjudicates the specific performance claim
only (see Interpretation No. 2, supra), then this finding is
dicta and need not be considered by this Court.
30

Such courts have explained that in the bankruptcy and liquidation
estate context, the standard for setting aside a previous Order
confirming a sale is much stricter than the standard for
evaluating a proposed sale for approval.

See In re WPRV-TV,

Inc., 983 F.2d 336, 340-41 (1st Cir. 1993); Matter of Chung King,
Inc., 753 F.2d 547, 550 (7th Cir. 1985); In re Transcontinental
Energy Corp., 683 F.2d 326, 328 (9th Cir. 1982); In re Webcor,
392 F.2d 893, 899 (7th Cir.), cert, denied. Silver, Inc. v.
Webcor, Inc., 393 U.S. 837 (1968); In re Furst, 57 B.R. 1013,
1016 (E.D. Pa. 1986); In re Lamont, 453 F. Supp. 608, 609-10
(N.D.N.Y. 1978), aff'd, 603 F.2d 213 (2d Cir. 1979); In re
Homestead Industries, Inc., 138 B.R. 788, 790 (Bankr. W.D. Pa.
1992); In re University Avenue Properties, 55 B.R. 986, 989
(Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1986).

In determining whether to approve a

proposed sale, the primary focus is to obtain the highest price
for the liquidation estate.

When evaluating a previously

approved sale, on the other hand, the primary focus is the need
for finality and protection of the integrity of the judicial sale
process.

See University Avenue Properties, 555 B.R. at 989.

"If

parties are to be encouraged to bid at judicial sales there must
be stability in such sales and the time must come when a fair bid
is accepted and the proceedings are ended."

Webcor, 392 F.2d at

899.
Because of the need for finality and integrity in the
judicial sales procedure, courts may not set aside a previouslyapproved judicial sale "unless 'compelling equities' outweigh the
interests in finality."

Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550

(citing

Transcontinental Energy, 683 F.2d at 328). There must be
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egregious fraud, unfairness or mistake.
"fundamental defect.f'26

There must be a

Homestead Industries, 138 B.R. at 790.

See also Lamont, 453 F. Supp. at 609-10;

University Avenue

Properties, 55 B.R. at 989; Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550;
Homestead Industries, 138 B.R. at 790.27
Accordingly, courts in liquidation proceedings have very
little discretion in determining whether to set aside a
previously approved sale.

" [T]he decision of the court to set

aside a confirmed judicial sale in bankruptcy is an extraordinary
one to be exercised only in very limited circumstances."
University Avenue Properties, 55 B.R. at 989.

See also Homestead

Industries, 13 8 B.R. at 790 ("Bankruptcy courts are loath to
tamper with a confirmed sale of estate property");

WPRV-TV, 983

F.2d at 34 0 (Courts have a "relatively narrow range of
discretion" and may "vacate a prior order confirming a sale only
in very limited circumstances"); Transcontinental Energy, 638
F.2d at 328 (Courts "are especially hesitant to set aside

26

This standard applies whether the previously-approved sale
is challenged on appeal to a higher court, see WPRV-TV, 983 F.2d
at 340-41; Furst, 57 B.R. at 1013, or on a motion to set aside
raised before the same court which approved the sale. See
Homestead Industries. 138 B.R. at 788; University Avenue
Properties, 55 B.R. at 986.
27

In a recent ruling, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals
applied a much less stringent standard in determining whether an
approved judicial sale should be vacated. In In re BCD Corp.
(Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc. v. Peak Investment, Inc.),
119 F.3d 852 (10th Cir. 1997), where Golfland appealed the
Bankruptcy Court's vacation of an Order approving the sale of the
Water Park (which was to be sold in conjunction with the Barn),
the Tenth Circuit ruled that a judicial sale may be vacated based
upon mere mistake. See id. at 860-62. This lenient standard
appears to be contrary to the great weight of authority from
other jurisdictions which provide a strict legal standard for
disturbing approved sales.
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confirmed bankruptcy sales"); Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550
("[T]he court's range of discretion on this matter is quite
narrow") .28
In the present case, the Liquidator is wholly unable to meet
the standard required to set aside Judge Stirba's previous
approval of the sale.

None of the facts alleged, even if true,

approach the degree of egregiousness required to set aside the
Court's approval.

None of the facts establish "manifest

unfairness."
The Lower Court's disregard of the previously approved
February 24 Order undermines the integrity of the judicial sale
process.

Golfland was a good faith third-party bidder at the

28

It is important to note that the receipt of a higher
offer for the estate's assets, and the potential to gain more
money for the estate, is not a valid factor to consider in
setting aside a sale. Unless the initial sales price is so
"grossly inadequate as to shock the conscience of the court,"
Chung King, 753 F.2d at 550, a subsequent higher offer, even if
substantially higher, will not disturb the finality of the sale.
Id.
Setting aside a sale, which had already been
confirmed by the bankruptcy judge, on the ground
that a better price for the real estate could be
obtained, would make a mockery of the hearing
conducted by the bankruptcy judge . . . .
In re Furst, 57 B.R. 1013, 1016 (E.D. Pa. 1986). Although a
subsequent higher offer might provide extra money to the
liquidation estate in the present case, the allowance of such an
offer would destroy confidence in the integrity of the judicial
sale. "[I]n the long run such a practice would be penny wise and
pound foolish. Creditors in general would suffer if
unpredictability discouraged bidders altogether. At the least
such practices might encourage low formal bids." In re Gil-Bern
Industries, Inc., 526 F.2d 627, 629 (1st Cir. 1975).
In the present case, there can be no allegation that the
sales price is inadequate. Golfland's offer was the highest and
best offer submitted at the auction. Provo City's subsequent
offer, over six months later, was not significantly higher than
the Golfland sales price. Thus, there is simply no basis to
disturb the finality of the sale.
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February 22 auction.

It purchased the Barn in the good faith

belief that the integrity of the judicial sale would be protected
by the court.

Golfland's expectation was undermined by the

conduct of the Liquidator.

The Liquidator first engaged in

conduct which caused the failure of the sale to close at the
scheduled time.

Thereafter, the Liquidator led Golfland to

believe that the sale would be completed notwithstanding the
failure to close on April 8, 1994.

Golfland continued to pursue

its rights in the Barn based upon such representations.

It was

not until the Liquidator received an offer for more money that
the Liquidator suddenly changed its position and tried to back
out of its contractual obligations to Golfland.
If the Liquidator is successful in its attempt to repudiate
the contract, the integrity of all judicial sales will be
undermined.

Potential purchasers will not be willing to bid as

much money -

or to bid at all - - a t such sales if they know they

are subject to lose the entire sale if the seller obtains a
subsequent higher offer for the property.
In order to protect the judicial sale process, the Court
must give more deference to the initial sales process.

Mere

difficulties or irregularities should not be enough to disturb
the sale.

Similarly, the seller may not be allowed to repudiate

the sale as soon as a higher offer is obtained.
In the present case, this Court must give deference to Judge
Stirba's February 24 Order approving the sale to Golfland.
February Order should not be disturbed absent a showing that
Golfland engaged in egregious conduct resulting in manifest
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The

unfairness.29

Because the Lower Court failed to consider the

proper legal standard in determining whether to invalidate the
February 24 Order, the Court's July 7 Order should be reversed.
C.

The Failure of Conditions Precedent

In the July 7 Order, the Lower Court found that the Barn
Contract was "contingent upon conditions which never occurred."
See July 7 Order, R. 3132 at 1 2.

Golfland concedes that certain

conditions in the Barn Contract did not occur.

Specifically,

Golfland does not dispute that the Simultaneous Closing Provision
was not met, or that the sale did not close with the time
required by the Timing Provisions.
Thus, on its face, the language of this factual finding is
not erroneous.

Nevertheless, Golfland submits that,

notwithstanding the failure of these conditions, the Liquidator
has not been absolved of its contractual obligations toward
Golfland.
Utah law provides two independent bases for enforcing a
contract notwithstanding the failure of conditions precedent.
Both of these bases are relevant in the present case.

First, the

law provides that a party who is responsible for the failure of a
condition may not escape liability based upon such failure.
Second, the law provides that where a party waives a condition,
the contract may be enforced despite the failure of such
condition.

29

Obviously, the sale should not be set aside if the
Liquidator's conduct is found to result in manifest unfairness.
The Liquidator should not benefit from its own egregious conduct.
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1.

A Party Who Causes the Failure of a Condition Precedent
May Not Escape Contractual Liability Based Upon the
Failure of Such Condition.

In the present case, the Liquidator was under a duty to see
that the conditions to the Barn Contract came to fruition.

The

Liquidator was under both (1) an affirmative duty to see that the
conditions precedent were fulfilled; and/or (2) a negative duty
to refrain from interfering with the fulfillment of any condition
precedent.
These duties arise out of contract and law.
First, the duty is found, expressly and impliedly, in the
Barn Contract.

The Barn Contract contains an express provision

which impose a duty upon the Liquidator to pursue diligently and
to use its best efforts to satisfy the fulfillment of the
conditions to closing.

(See H 7, supra).

Similarly, the Liquidator executed a supplemental Barn
Contract on April 8, 1994, wherein it warranted that the sales
transactions had been approved by the appropriate courts.

(See

R. 2033 at n.3).
Next, even where the contract imposes no duty with respect
to the fulfillment of conditions precedent, such a duty may be
imposed by law.

The Court may impose a duty to make "reasonable

efforts" to satisfy the condition, to act in good faith to
satisfy the condition, or simply to refrain from conduct which
would prevent the fulfillment of the condition.
Where a contract is conditioned upon the approval of a third
party (for example, a title company, a bank, or a Court) the law
will require that the parties act in good faith and make
reasonable efforts to obtain such approval -- even if the
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contract itself imposes no such duties.

This concept is

explained in the Restatement of Contracts:
A contracts to sell and B to buy a house for $50,000,
with the provision, "this contract is conditional on
approval by X bank of B's pending mortgage
applications." Approval by X bank is a condition of
B's duty. B is under no duty that the X bank approve
his application, but a Court will
supply
a term

imposing on him a duty to make reasonable
obtain
approval.

efforts

to

Restatement (Second) of Contracts, §225, Illustration 8 (citing
Id. at §§ 204, 205) (emphasis added). 30
Furthermore, Section 2 05 of the Restatement imposes a duty
of good faith and fair dealing in all contracts.
been clearly recognized under Utah law.

This duty has

"[E]very contract

includes a covenant of good faith with respect to dealings
between the parties.

The parties to a contract must deal fairly

and honestly with each other."

Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.,

618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) (emphasis added).
At the very minimum, the Liquidator was under a duty to
refrain from conduct which would cause the conditions to fail.
Pursuant to the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
"each party impliedly promises that he will not intentionally or
purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the other
party's right to receive the fruits of the contract."

St.

Benedict's Development Co. v. St. Benedict's Hospital, 811 P.2d
194, 199 (Utah 1991).
30

Courts will not impose a duty to obtain approval where
neither party has control over the approval process, and neither
party is at fault for the failure to obtain approval. See Welch
Transfer & Storage, Inc. v. Oldham, 663 P.2d 73, 76 (Utah 1983).
Nevertheless, at the very minimum, Courts will impose a duty to
not act so as to hinder or interfere with the fulfillment of a
condition precedent.
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A fundamental aspect of Utah contracts law is that "one
party may not render it difficult or impossible for the other to
continue performance and then take advantage of the nonperformance he has caused."

Zion's Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538

P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975).
When a contract is dependent upon the occurrence of certain
conditions, each party is "legally bound not to frustrate the
fulfillment of those conditions, especially where their nonoccurrence would benefit" that party.

Bastian v. Cedar Hills

Investment & Land Co., 632 P.2d 818, 821 (Utah 1981).

A party

which causes the failure of the condition precedent injures the
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract.

Such

acts are a breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing and are actionable for breach of contract.
Clearly, a party who causes the failure of a condition
precedent may not rely upon that failure to excuse its
performance under the contract.
Where a contract is performable on the occurrence of a
future event, there is an implied agreement that the
promisor will place no obstacle in the way of the
happening of such event, particularly where it is
dependent in whole or in part on his own act; and where

he prevents the fulfillment
of a condition precedent
its performance by the adverse party, he cannot rely
such condition to defeat his
liability.

or
on

Dohanvos v. Prudential Insurance Co., 952 F.2d 947, 951 (6th Cir.
1992) (quoting 13 C.J. §722, at 648) (emphasis added).

See also

In re LCS Homes, Inc. 103 B.R. 736, 743-44 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1989)
("a party to a contract is under a duty not to prevent
performance by the other party"); Gatoil (U.S.A.), Inc. v.
Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority. 801 F.2d 451, 456
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(D.C. Cir. 1986) (a seller who violates his duty to exercise good
faith in attempting to secure the fulfillment of a conditioned
precedent thereby preventing the underlying contract from coming
into effect is liable for breach of contract); and cases cited
therein.
Thus, in the present case, the Liquidator was under a duty
to: (1) use its best efforts to achieve fulfillment of the
condition precedent; (2) make reasonable efforts to achieve
fulfillment of the condition precedent; (3) act in good faith
with respect to the fulfillment of the condition precedent;
and/or (4) not take any steps which would hinder, frustrate, or
prevent the fulfillment of the condition precedent.
The Liquidator violated each and every one of these duties.
As discussed in Part III.D., III.E., and III.F., infra, to the
extent conditions precedent in the Barn Contract have failed, the
Liquidator is responsible for the failure of each condition.
2.

A Party Who Waives the Occurrence of a Condition
Precedent May Not Escape Contractual Liability Based
Upon the Non-Occurrence of the Condition

Pursuant to Utah law, any contract provision or condition
precedent may be waived by the parties.

"[W]aiver occurs when an

obligor manifests an intent not to require an obligee to strictly
comply with a contractual duty."

Lone Mountain Production Co. v.

Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 710 F. Supp. 305, 311 (D. Utah 1989)
aff'd 984 F.2d 1551 (10th Cir. 1992) . Waiver may be expressed or
implied.

It is exhibited through words or through conduct

"inconsistent with an intent to insist on [the waiving party's]
contractual rights."
296, 297 (Utah 1951).

Id.

See also Ahrendt v. Bobbitt, 229 P.2d

A party may show waiver through conduct by
39

acting as if the contract is in force, continuing to perform
under the contract, urging the other party to continue
performance, or any other act which exhibits an intent to
continue with the contract.

See 17A C.J.S. § 492(1).

A party who has waived a contractual right or condition "may
not thereafter seek judicial enforcement" of that right.
Mountain, 710

Lone

F.Supp. at 311. A party who has, through its

words or deeds, indicated a willingness to proceed without the
occurrence of a condition precedent, has waived the condition and
may not use it to escape its contractual obligations.

"[O]ne

party to a contract may not lull the other into a false assurance
that strict compliance with a contractual duty will not be
required and then sue for non-compliance."

Id.

Furthermore, where a sales contract is part of a "package"
of contracts, a waiver of a condition in one contract constitutes
a waiver with respect to all of the contracts in the package.
See Walker v. Feiring, 632 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Or. App. 1981).
A party may waive terms and conditions under the contract
despite the existence of an anti-waiver clause in the contract.
Dillman v. Massey-Fercruson, Inc., 369 P.2d 296, 298 (Utah 1962)
("parties to written contracts may modify, waive or make new
terms regardless of provisions in the contracts to the
contrary").

See also Lone Mountain Production Co. v. Natural Gas

Pipeline Co., 984 F.2d 1551, 1557 (10th Cir. 1992) ("Under
general rules, and in particular, under Utah law, parties may
modify or waive the terms of a contract, despite contractual
provisions to the contrary.")
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In the present case, the facts show that the Liquidator
waived the Simultaneous Closing Provision (see Part III.D.,
infra), the Timing Provisions (see Part III.E., infra), and the
Tender requirements (see Part III.F., infra).

Having waived such

conditions, the Liquidator cannot now rely upon their nonoccurrence to escape performance and liability owed to Golfland.
In conclusion to this section, Golfland does not contest the
Court's finding that the sale was contingent upon conditions
which never occurred.

Golfland does contest, however, the

Court's failure to acknowledge that the Liquidator: (1) caused
the non-occurrence of the conditions, and (2) waived the
conditions.

Under Utah law, the Liquidator must not be allowed

to benefit from its own breach of duty and waiver.

Accordingly,

the failure of conditions does not absolve the Liquidator of its
contractual obligations toward Golfland.
D.

The Simultaneous Closing Provision

The Lower Court found that the Barn Contract was frustrated
by the failure of the Simultaneous Closing Provision.
Order, R. 3132 at f 5.

See July 7

The Liquidator may not use the failure of

this provision to escape its liability to Golfland.
The Liquidator is responsible for the failure of the
Simultaneous Closing provision.

But for the Liquidator's

improper conduct, the sale of both the Water Park and the Barn
would have closed simultaneously on April 8, 1994.

First, the

Liquidator breached its affirmative duty to make sure that the
conditions were met.

Specifically, the

Liquidator did not use

its best efforts and/or did not act reasonably in obtaining court
approval for the sale of the Water Park.
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As a result, the

Liquidator was unable to obtain title insurance for the Water
Park and was unable to close on the sale at the scheduled time.
This caused the Simultaneous Closing Provision of the Barn
Contract to fail.
Similarly, the Liquidator breached its duty not to interfere
or hinder the fulfillment of the conditions.

The facts show that

had the Liquidator not engaged in secret negotiations, doubledealing, and misrepresentations, the validity of the Court
approval for the Water Park would never have been challenged and
the Simultaneous Closing Provision would never have failed.
Next, the Liquidator has clearly waived enforcement of the
Simultaneous Closing provision.

Although the Liquidator did not

make an express waiver of this provision on April 8, 1994, it
indicated a willingness to discuss the possibility of waiver by
questioning Golfland whether it would be willing to close on the
Shed and the Barn independent from the Water Park.

At that time,

all parties agreed that there was too much uncertainty and that
the parties would work together towards a simultaneous closing of
all three properties as soon as possible.
Thereafter, the Liquidator expressly waived the simultaneous
closing provision.

The Liquidator did so through various

communications with Golfland and by attempting to sell the^Water
Park separate and independent from the Barn and Shed.

At no time

did the Liquidator ever state that the failure of the
Simultaneous Closing Provision would prevent closing on the sale
of the Barn.

Furthermore, in July, 1994, the Liquidator held an

auction for the sale of the Water Park independent from the Barn.
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Later, in 1995, the Liquidator actually sold the Water Park
separate from the Barn.
The Liquidator's acts and representations clearly establish
a waiver of the Simultaneous Closing provision.

Now that the

Liquidator no longer owns the Water Park, it can hardly insist
that it be sold simultaneously with the Barn.
In conclusion, because the Liquidator caused the
Simultaneous Closing Provision to fail and because the Liquidator
waived the provision, the Simultaneous Closing Provision is no
longer a condition of the Barn Contract and cannot be used by the
Liquidator to escape its contractual obligations toward Golfland.
E.

The Timing Provisions

The Lower Court specifically found that "the closing of the
sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland did not occur in a timely
fashion."

(See July 7 Order, R. 3132 at % 4 ) . Contrary to the

Liquidator's position, this failure of the Timing Provisions did
not absolve the Liquidator of its contractual responsibilities to
Golfland.
First, as explained above, the Liquidator was responsible
for the failure to close.

But for the Liquidator's improper

actions and omissions, the sale of the Barn would have been
completed on April 8, 1994.

The law is clear that one who

prevents the occurrence of a condition cannot take advantage of
its non-occurrence.

Thus, despite the failure to close on April

8, 1994, Golfland is entitled to the fruits of the Barn Contract.
Next, even if the Liquidator did not cause the failure to
close, the record is clear that it has waived the right to insist
upon compliance with the Timing Provisions.
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As discussed in Part

III.C.2., supra, a party is deemed to have waived a contract
provision if it acts in a manner inconsistent with an intent to
enforce the condition.
Contractual time constraints, including "time is of the
essence" clauses may be waived by failing to insist upon strict
compliance with such clauses.
[I]f the vendor, for whose benefit the stipulation
about time being of the essence of the contract is
made, would insist upon it, he must act promptly
upon that provision so that any indulgence upon
his part will amount to a nullification of that
feature of the covenant.
Walker v. Feirinq, 632 P.2d 1270, 1272 (Or. App. 1981) (emphasis
added).
A party seeking to avoid its obligations based upon a
contract timing provision must timely assert its rights under the
provision.
provision,

If,

the party
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In the present case, the facts show that the Liquidator has
waived its rights to enforce the Timing Provisions of the Barn
Contract.

On multiple occasions, time and time again, the

Liquidator has acted in a manner inconsistent with an intent to
enforce the Timing Provisions.
First, at the time of the failed closing on April 8, 1994,
the Liquidator led Golfland to believe that, notwithstanding the
Timing Provisions, it was not necessary to close on the sale of
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the Barn Property at that time.

It led Golfland to believe that

the parties could and would close on the sale of the Combined
Properties after the problems with the sale of the Water Park
were resolved.
Thereafter, over the next few months, the Liquidator on
several occasions demonstrated an intent to waive the Timing
Provisions.

Golfland has identified 8 different occasions from

April through July 1994 where the Liquidator led Golfland to
believe that it still intended to complete the sale of the Barn
to Golfland.

(See R. 2040-2043).

It was not until August, 1994 (after the Liquidator learned
that it could obtain more money if it would repudiate its
contractual obligations toward Golfland), that the Liquidator
suddenly reversed its position on the timing issue.

At that

time, the Liquidator first attempted to use the Timing Provisions
to escape its obligations to Golfland.

Suddenly, notwithstanding

its earlier representations, the Liquidator sought to strictly
enforce the Timing Provisions -- arguing that Golfland lost all
rights in the Barn when the sale failed to close on April 8,
1994.31
In light of the clear facts of this case, the Liquidator's
current position is simply untenable.

Under the law, the

Liquidator is not allowed to lull Golfland in to a false
assurance, and then suddenly demand strict compliance.

Having

waived all rights under the Timing Provisions, the Liquidator may
31

The alleged failure of the Timing Provisions was
obviously an afterthought -- brought up after-the-fact in a
belated attempt to justify the Liquidator's blatant breach of
contractual obligations toward Golfland.
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not use such provisions to escape its liabilities under the Barn
Contract.

The Liquidator waived any right to demand strict

compliance with the Timing Provisions by acting in a manner
entirely inconsistent with an intent to enforce such provisions.
Accordingly, the Liquidator may not be allowed to strictly
enforce the Timing Provisions at this time.
In conclusion, because the Liquidator (1) caused the failure
of the Timing Provisions, and (2) waived the Timing Provisions,
Golfland should be allowed to pursue its rights under the Barn
Contract notwithstanding the failure of the Timing Provisions.
F.

Golfland's Tender of the Purchase Price

In the July 7 Order, the Liquidator found that "Golfland's
tender of the purchase funds for the SAIC Barn with the strings
that Golfland attached to it did not amount to the proper tender
with respect to closing."

(See July 7 Order, R. 3132 H 3 ) . This

finding is erroneous as a matter of fact and law.
The record shows that Golfland was prepared to tender the
full purchase price for all three Seven Peaks' properties within
two weeks after the auction.

The Liquidator, however, was unable

to convey full title to the property at that time.

Accordingly,

it was agreed by both parties that Golfland would deposit its
purchase money with the Title Company and that the sale would
close on April 8, 1994 -- after the Liquidator had obtained full
title to the property.

In accordance with this agreement,

Golfland deposited the full purchase price with the Title Company
in a timely manner.

Golfland instructed the Title Company that

the funds should be held for the benefit of Golfland until
further notice.

Golfland did so in order to protect its interest
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in the funds pending the Liquidator's ability to convey title.
Golfland's retention of discretion over the funds was in full
compliance with the terms of the Barn Contract and the agreement
of the parties.

Thus, the Court's finding that Golfland's tender

was insufficient is erroneous.
Furthermore, and more importantly, even if Golfland's tender
was somehow lacking, the Liquidator clearly waived the right to
challenge the sufficiency of the tender.

At the time of the

tender, Golfland sent a copy of its tender instruction letter to
the Liquidator's counsel.

Thus, the Liquidator was on notice as

of March 9, 1994, as to the form and nature of Golfland's tender.
At no time, however, did the Liquidator object to the fact that
Golfland had retained some discretion over the funds.

At no time

did the Liquidator indicate that there was anything deficient
whatsoever about the tender.

On the contrary, the Liquidator

stated on numerous occasions that Golfland's tender was fully
adequate.

For example:

1.
The Liquidator testified that, pursuant to its
interpretation of the Sales Contracts, Golfland was required
to deposit its money in escrow with the title company within
two weeks. The Liquidator testified that it communicated
this interpretation of the closing requirements to counsel
for Golfland. The Liquidator further testified that
Golfland did in fact deposit such funds as required.
(See
R. 2017 at H 106(a)).
2.
On another occasion, the Liquidator represented in
writing the following to the Bankruptcy Court:
As required by its bid, Golfland deposited the
full purchase price of $2.61 million with the
title company pending closing on April 9, 1994.
At the closing on April 9, all conveyance
documents were executed. The instructions to the
escrow agent are to record the conveyance
documents and disburse funds upon the issuance of
the policy of title insurance.
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(See R. 2017-2018 at % 106(b)).
3.
On yet another occasion, the Liquidator testified
that Golfland, in depositing the funds with the title
company, had done "all that they had to do." (See R. 2018
at 1 106(c)).
4.
The Liquidator further explained: " [W] e were
satisfied as of March 8th that [Golfland] had complied with
what they needed to do." (See R. 2018 at 1 106(c)).
5.
Later, when Golfland determined that it was
advisable to withdraw the funds deposited for the purchase
of the Water Park Property, it sought and obtained written
approval from the Liquidator to do so. This illustrates
that Golfland did not have unilateral discretion over the
funds and that the withdrawal of such funds required the
approval of both parties. It also illustrates that the
Liquidator approved of the form of Golfland's tender. (See
R. 2046) .
6.
On July 13, 1994, the Liquidator signed its
approval to Golfland's letter instructing the Title Company
to hold the remaining funds "pending further instructions
from Golfland." If such discretion is improper, the
Liquidator should never have signed its approval. By
approving Golfland's arrangement with the title company, the
Liquidator again waived any right to subsequently declare
the arrangement improper.
(See R. 2019 at % 110).
In reliance upon the Liquidator's actions and statements as
to the sufficiency of Golfland's tender, Golfland made no effort
to alter the status of its tender of the purchase price.
Suddenly, in August 1994, notwithstanding its previous
testimony and conduct, the Liquidator switched positions and
argued for the very first time that Golfland's tender was
insufficient.32
The Liquidator's conduct illustrates a waiver of the right
to contest the sufficiency of Golfland's tender (even assuming
that the tender was inadequate).

32

The Liquidator's silence in

It should be noted that the Liquidator did not take this
position until after it received the Provo City offer for more
money on the sale of the Barn.
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failing to object to the sufficiency of the tender for nearly six
months -- and its affirmative conduct in testifying that the
tender was sufficient -- are wholly inconsistent with the
subsequent self-serving statement that the tender was deficient.
If the Liquidator had complaints about the form of
Golfland's tender, it should have made them known.

Instead, the

Liquidator led Golfland to believe that the tender was sufficient
when it testified, on multiple occasions, that the Liquidator
believed the tender to be complete and when it signed its
approval to the form of such tender.

Having taken this position,

the Liquidator may not assert the opposite position at this time.
The Liquidator may not lull Golfland into a false assurance and
then attempt to demand strict compliance as a basis to avoid
liability.
In conclusion, the Lower Court erred in finding that
Golfland's tender was not sufficient.

Furthermore, the Court

erred in failing to acknowledge, or even consider, the fact that
the Liquidator waived the right to object to the sufficiency of
Golfland's tender.
CONCLUSION
Golfland respectfully requests the Court to reverse the July
7 Order, to reinstate the validity of the February 24 Order, and
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to allow Golfland to pursue its claims against the Liquidator in
the pending Barn Litigation.
DATED this

/ S

day of May, 1998.
CALLISTER NEBEKER & McCULLOUGH

Zachary T. Shields
Attorneys for Golfland
Entertainment Centers, Inc,
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1
2

E R O £ E . E . D £ N G S _
THE COURT: Do we have everyone here in the

3 on the Southern American

Insurance Company

4

MR. CARLILE: N o , I'll

go get

5

THE COURT: Would you

please?

6

Before we get started

7 in the

courtroom

case?

them.

is there a Mr. Michael

Harris

courtroom?

8

UNKNOWN SPEAKER: Y e s .

9

THE COURT: And there have been two late f i l i n g s .

10 Golfland
11 yesterday

filed an objection, but I got the motion
for Valley Asphalt

asking for me to

12 it, and then just a few minutes ago a motion
13 Golfland was delivered

to m e , asking me to

14 today's hearing date; asking
15 hearing.

I'd

from

continue

like more time on these m o t i o n s , I don't
Why don't

17 each take a minute to address everything

that's

18 us and what you think we can best accomplish
MR. CARLILE: I'm

20 the Southern American

Craig Carlile and I'm
Insurance Company.

21 of town for three days.
22 Monson

liquidate

for a little scope of the

16 like late filings but we're all here.

19

filed

you
before

today.

representing
I've

been

out

I came back this morning and Mr.

is here with m e , from our office.

23 that Valley Asphalt had filed,
24 for me to file a complaint

I believe

He was

it's a motion

for insubordination

25 bankruptcy p r o c e d u r e . I haven't
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aware

and

seen those p l e a d i n g s ,

1 I'm positive, from Valley Asphalt.
2 those kinds of things

And I understand

(inaudible). They came hand-

3 delivered to our office this morning by Mr. Shields
4 contingent to this hearing.
"5

We don't think, first of all, the Valley Asphalt

6 client, that they have any reason to be in this
7 proceeding at all. We're dealing with the water park
8 order and the evidence of the water park case, BCD
9 bankruptcy case. They have no interest in the water
10 park. Those are issues that we can address at some
11 point, but I don't think they have any bearing on the
12 motion with the liquidator at this state, to capture the
13 bid
14

for the water park.
As to Mr. Shield's motion to continue, my vote is

15 briefly to look at that, I have not read it in detail.
16

THE COURT: I haven't looked at it beyond reading the

17 caption, I haven't even seen it.
18

MR. CARLILE: Well, essentially what they are asking

19 is that they continue because John Kennedy of Golfland
20 is not available for this hearing today. And that it
21 really prostitutes the honor to serve the client as they
22 are required.
23

My response to that would be several responses

24 actually. One, well, the other thing that they argue to
25 that motion is that this hearing is an expedited hearing
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1 and there's no reason or emergency that exists for an
2 expedited hearing. But this is not an expedited hearing,
3 it's not an expedited motion. It was filed in court as
4 the Judge ruled.
5

THE COURT: No, I grant you, this is not an expedited

6 hearing, it's proceeded under the normal course of rules
7 of so procedure and Code of Judicial Administration.
8

MR. CARLILE: The second issue is as to whether Mr.

9 Kennedy is present and whether there ought to be -10 whether this hearing ought to be continued. The question
11 is, what does he offer to this hearing?

What is the

12 need to have Mr. Kennedy here?
13

What this is, is a motion to approve the use of cash

14 in the estate to enhance the bid, which in the
15 liquidator's best judgment interest would be the thing
16 to do.

So what is an issue is what the liquidator's

17 interest business judgment actually is in this
18 particular case, and Mr. Kennedy has nothing to offer as
19 to what the liquidator's business judgment is in the
20 facts on this case.

If Mr. Kennedy were present, I

21 think what Mr. Kennedy would have to offer is that this
22 water park would indeed be worth $3,040,000, which is
23 what Golfland offered in the second bid. And that's what
24 we're saying.

Why we want to arrange to enhance this

25 bid is because this water park is worth more than the
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1 $242,000 that Golfland said before, which the bankruptcy
2 court has set aside. In the event he could offer a
3 premium offer.
4

Now, other than that, we think we ought to be able

5 to go forward and I ask the Court why it is in the best
6 interest of this estate -7

THE COURT: Thank you.

We'll come back to that.

8 Thank you.
9
10

Mr. Shields?
MR. SHIELDS: My name is Jeffrey R. Shields, I

11 represent Golfland with a motion to continue.
12 little more background is necessary.

I think a

The motion to go

13 to bankruptcy court is scheduled to be here next
14 Wednesday with the notice out in June.

My client and I

15 both anticipate, we plan to be at that hearing next
16 Wednesday.

We both planned to be out of town and I

17 asked him to be here today, but Mr. Kennedy is out of
18 town and he cannot be here.
19

Last Friday Mr. Carlile called me and asked for an

20 extension of the deadline for our losses in excess
21 damages to be filed to this court's order, and there was
22 no mention of this hearing. I didn't get notice of this
23 hearing until Monday evening, and I had to cancel my
24 vacation plans and be here, and I can't get John
25 Kennedy.

When I tried to call and schedule I was told
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1 that what the emergency
2 hearing next Wednesday

is, is an emergency

for

in bankruptcy court, if we

3 having this hearing today before that hearing
4 Wednesday,

this
don't

next

there is going to be a real problem.

I don't

5 think there is an emergency.
6

THE COURT: You didn't hear that from my clerk.

7 don't even know about bankruptcy here, in fact we
8 concern ourselves with what's going on in

We
don't

bankruptcy

9 court.
10

MR. S H I E L D S : I was told that because of the

11 in bankruptcy

court on Wednesday that's why we had

12 have this hearing

THE COURT: Who told you

14

MR. S H I E L D S : I thought

15

THE COURT: Okay, go ahead.

16

MR. SHIELDS: Anyway, your Honor, the reason

17 think this hearing

to

today.

13

that?
it was your

clerk.

I don't

should be held today is one, because

18 I only had two days notice
19 here, and I'm

hearing

for it, my client

is not

not sure as to whether or not this

20 evidentiary hearing or not, if the Court

is

intends to take

21 e v i d e n c e , but we're not -22
23
24

THE COURT: It's not going to be an

evidentiary

hearing.
MR. S H I E L D S : Okay.

25 evidence

Your Honor, the people

that is going to be taken because

Addendum - Page _j_

needed

I see

some

1 substantial facts that are critical to the Court for
2 determination.
3

For example, what is the risk of the estate getting

4 money back?

What is the likelihood of equitable

5 subordination of their client without a competing
6 business in the property?

They cite things like the

7 opinion of BCD who is one of the complainants and even
8 if all the unsecured creditors don't get paid, they'll
9 get 96% of the money back. Those are heavy duty factual
10 issues.
11

THE COURT: Certificate of service on this motion

12 says it was hand delivered to your office in the 30th of
13 June.
14

Do you want to address that?

MR. SHIELDS: The motion was, but no notice of

15 hearing. See, the hearing wasn't scheduled until Monday
16 and I would work -- if I had at least known I would have
17 arranged Mr. Kennedy's schedule last week, but when I
18 didn't get it until Monday, I just can't be here. If
19 it's not an evidentiary hearing, I'm prepared to argue
20 the legal aspect.
21

Your Honor, I think there are some significant

22 factual aspects that this Court needs to hear. We're
23 talking about a $3,000,000 asset, and what the
24 liquidators are asking to do is use the state money to
25 go buy that asset and then they say don't worry we'll
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1 give it all back.

There are some significant

issues

2 that relate to that that I think this Court should hear.
3

THE COURT: Thank you.

4

MR. ZUNDELL: Mr. Zundell, your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Mr. Zundell?

6

MR. ZUNDELL: Valley Asphalt is here, your Honor,

7 because of paragraph 13 of the order the Court issued in
8 this case, Valley Asphalt, which proceeded in the
9 bankruptcy court, to determine whether or not SAIC will
10 receive money on a priority basis from that bankruptcy
11 case.
12

We have been threatened with contempt asserting

13 that, by the liquidators attorneys, asserting that
14 paragraph 13 prevents that.

We don't think that is

15 true.
16

The action we would like filed is insubordination

17 claim that would proceed in a bankruptcy court under
18 Section 510 of the Bankruptcy Code.

And it would

19 proceed by adversary proceeding directed at the claim
20 that has been filed by SAIC in the bankruptcy court.
21

THE COURT: Why is this matter so urgent in terms of

22 the timing?
23

MR. ZUNDELL: Because the claim we have a hearing,

24 preliminary scheduled in the bankruptcy court at 11:00
25 Wednesday morning, which is just a few hours before the
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1 hearing on the motion to sell this property and

allow

2 the SAIC liquidator to press bid. And our motion

would

3 seek an injunction against the credit on the basis
4 the SAIC was insubordinate

for the actions taken

that

since

5 the bankruptcy case began.
6

We think that those

7 position

-- we understand

that

is said that my client doesn't have

8 claim, that's something
9 determine.

for the bankruptcy

That's something

SAIC's
another

court

to

for the interest of the

10 bankruptcy court to determine. We don't think that
11 claim can be well- received on that part, and we
12 simply want to get to the tribunal to have
13 to decide this issue.

16

just

jurisdiction

We think it's the better part of

14 discretion to come to this Court to threaten
15 contempt

their

with

and ask to proceed.

THE COURT: Why did you wait so long to file a motion

17 when you would been aware for some time, I assume, that
18 the liquidator was going to proceed with attempting
19 utilize
20

the credit as part of

to

this.

MR. ZUNDELL: You say we've been aware for this time,

21 I don't know that that's true.
22

THE COURT: It was published around the end of June,

23 wasn't

it, Mr.

Carlile?

24

MR. CARLILE: Y e s .

25)

THE COURT: You're talking about notice as the

fact
8
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1 that they attempted the bid on the water park.
2

MR. ZUNDELL: Perhaps, yes.

The only reason we

3 waited so long, your Honor, is that this is one action
4 in a long line of actions that we've taken.

My offer on

5 this probably stands in the neighborhood of $50,000 in
6 the last four months on this case.

And it would have

7 been very accurate in this case as related case of CES,
8 it's time now to get to this issue.
9

THE COURT: Well, with respect to your motion my

10 initial question is, you can file a motion before the
11 Court, I'm be happy to consider it, why shouldn't I give
12 the normal amount of time allowed by the rules to SAIC
13 to respond to your motion; giving you a chance to reply
14 and set it for some time down the road?
15

MR. ZUNDELL: Because we didn't have it, your Honor,

16 until the 6th of July.
17

THE COURT: That's right.

So why didn't you file

18 your motion in time so we can take the normal process
19 and have everybody have time to fully bring some
20 standing issues instead of telling me yesterday?
21
22 sir.

MR. ZUNDELL: I apologize for failing to do that,
I can only say that we have not sat on our hands.

23 We have been working very hard on this case and there
24 are many good matters.

Mr. Affleck

(sp?) has spent

25 money long hours on this, long days and nights on this
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1 case and this matter has just now come to a head.
2

THE COURT: And how is it your client would be

3 possibly prejudice
4
5

if we don't resolve the

motion

immediately?
MR. ZUNDELL: Well, we wish to have the

bankruptcy

6 court determine whether or not BCD ought to be
7 to credit bid, based upon a claim of
8

10

subordination.

THE COURT: Yet the hearing is scheduled to

9 that issue next Wednesday

allowed

in the bankruptcy

address

court?

MR. ZUNDELL: That's right. And as a preliminary

11 that hearing, we need to file that complaint
12 papers with bankruptcy
13 the liquidators

court.

to

in our

And we've been told by

that if we do that they will bring us

14 before you on charge of contempt.
15

THE COURT: Okay. Anything

further?

16

MR. SHIELDS: That's what bring us here judge.

Say

17 for that threat we would assume to proceed and file our
18 papers with the court.

I'm not sure when the threat

was

19 issued, but in that aspect since we may go all the way
20 to this Court
21

THE COURT: Let me ask Mr. Carlile first on what

22 SAIC provision
23

is why we've waited so long.
the

is on this?

MR. CARLILE: I'm not aware of any such threat.

24 gone over this and discussed this with Mr. Affleck
25 he indicated that has not made threats.

I've
and

If there's a
10
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1 threat, it exists in the court order that they filed
2 against it, so they had insurance company without proper
3 court clearance and it would be something to this
4 Court's rulings on how this court needs it done
5 appropriately, under the circumstances,
6

THE COURT: Do you agree that paragraph 13 of this

7 1992 order bars the filing of an action outside of this
8 Court without expressed approval?
9

MR. CARLILE: Yes.

That's why we came here before

10 when Golfland was seeking approval of this Court to file
11 a claim.

In terms of circumstances, that is in the eye

12 of the beholder, but there is not any kind of an
13 emergency matter that's been proceeding that I'm aware
14 of in the last several months.

I have done a lot of

15 work for Valley Asphalt that I think is unnecessary, but
16 that's not the point either.
17

The point is that the understanding Valley Asphalt

18 has, is that they filed a complaint over three
19 properties, the fire property and water park property
20 and golf course property.

So the litigation with them

21 was to determine whether there was a valid claim or
22 invalid claim. The bankruptcy court determined that that
23 was a valid claim and we disagree with that, but that
24 was determined.

So they have a secured claim on those

25 properties to which applied.
11
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1

Now, according to that Court there's no amount

2 that meaning attributable
3 property.

to the water and

fire

That's their only claim and the way

4 apportioned

those claims, and so they don't

5 anything that has to do with the water park
6

of

they've

have
issue.

In terms of being prejudice, if they did have a

7 claim,

it would be a secured claim.

8 out first.

It would get paid

There can't be any prejudice

9 they got paid out before the unsecured
10 we're

9 7 % percent

to the unsecured

to them

because

creditors

creditors

and

in any

11 event.
12

So, any way you look at it, one is not in effect

13 the circumstance, two, they can't be prejudice

because

14 they're going to get paid out, and three, as the
15 has well

indicated, this matter is to replace

Court

the

16 bankruptcy proceeding notice of this file that
17 mailed out on June 30th.

of

was

And here we are on the eve of

18 this hearing, and they want to have an expedited
19 and

I haven't had an opportunity to look at it.

20

THE COURT: You think it would prejudice

21 liquidator, if we went ahead and granted

hearing

SAIC, the

it and

filed

22 our lawsuit before the hearing on Wednesday?
23

MR. CARLILE: Well,

I think it could, in the sense if

24 it has a potential of stopping the sale and we loose
25| opportunity

to go forward.

I think it could have a
12
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the

1 significant
2 Company

affect on Southern American

in this case.

Insurance

I don't think there's any

3 that there would be any increased expenses
4 trustee, increased administrative

dispute

to the

e x p e n s e s , and once

the

5 park is sold, if the trustee eventually can get over

the

6 title problem,
7 off of that.

the trustee gets a significant
And who is injured by that?

8 creditors of BCD and Southern American

All

commission
the

Insurance

Company

9 would be increased by the cost.
10

THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Carlile.

11

MR. S H I E L D S : Your Honor, this Court asked

12 SAIC would be prejudice
13 understood

if the

if we allowed this lawsuit

and I

the answer to be is y e s , if we loose it.

And

14 all of the bad things that will happen to SAIC

according

15 to M r . Carlile will only happen if Judge Clark

decides

16 that they should happen. And that's what we w a n t .
17 what they're

saying

is we don't want judge Clark to have

18 the issue up, we want you to it stop, Judge.
19 want you to stop SAIC from talking.
20 Asphalt

And we

You can stop

from talking to Judge Clark. That's what

21 say this order is.

And

I really don't think

Valley
they

it does that,

22 but when someone threatens you for contempt, out of
23 respect
24 and ask.

for the judicial process, I think we should

come

We ask the Court to allow us to go to a judge

25| that has the jurisdiction to decide these issues.
13
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1

THE COURT: Okay. On the Valley Asphalt motion

we'll

2 allow Southern American and Golfland to respond to it -3 some time to respond in writing.
4 reasonable, Mr. Carlile, a short
5

MR. CARLILE: Well,

How much time would be
time?

I had the same thing that Mr.

6 Shield's h a s , I came down form scout camp on Wednesday
7 and I'm
8 for m e .

on my way back up. So, this week is really

shot

Mr. Monson can work on this obviously, and get

9 what we need to, but I need some time to be able to look
10 at it and I'm not going to be able to have it.
11

THE COURT: Tell me what

12

MR. CARLILE: W e l l , if your intent's to rule

13 the sale on Wednesday

it's going to take.
before

--

14

THE COURT: I don't think that can be done.

15

MR. CARLILE: Then I would like next week.

16

THE COURT: Let's have any response that is going to

17 be filed, filed by a week from tomorrow.
18 another hearing

I'll

19 can go to bankruptcy

contact you.

And if we need

I think Mr.

Zundell

court on Wednesday and tell

the

20 Court Judge Clark that the motion has been filed

for

21 leave in this court and that's been considered
22 to additional
23 opportunity

submission by the p a r t i e s .

You'll have an

to respond to anything that Mr.

24 files, and I'll

subject

Carlile

rule on that in due course, and I cannot

25 imagine that it will stop Judge Clark from

considering
14
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1 anything that is brought before.
2

MR. ZUNDELL: Thank you, Judge.

3

MR. SHIELDS: Thank you.

4

THE COURT: Let's go ahead on the other motion.

Mr.

5 Carlile, address the merits on that.
6

MR. CARLILE: All right.

I would like to simply say

7 that in the motion for Golfland to continue this
8 hearing, there's a number of issues that go to -- or
9 statements that go to the merits of our motion and I
10 believe that we have not had an opportunity to respond
11 to.
12

THE COURT: Mr. Zundell, do you want to create an

13 order to the effect of the schedule that I just said?
14

MR. ZUNDELL: Yes, your Honor.

15

THE COURT: Thank you.

16

Excuse the interruption.

17

MR. CARLILE: And part of that, that has us

18 concerned, we filed that motion and stated our facts in
19 our motion they filed a memorandum in opposition and
20 they challenged the factual statements that were made by
21 the motion.

That's how we received that memo that they

22 had this motion today.

And I think for the purposes of

23 this motion most procedural matters are established
24 because they failed to object to those as provided in
25| the rules .
15
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1

To this extent, this Court is troubled by that and

2 we wanted to present evidence and certainly we want to
3 present that, and we want the opportunity to respond to
4 that motion for continuation which are in effect to
5 certify our motion.
6

We can go through the -- for the Court the status of

7 things how they now stand.

Southern American Insurance

8 Company winds up with approximately $9,000,000 dollars
9 to BCD, what is now called BCD, subject to our Mr.
10 Orchard, the president of Ail-American Food Company, and
11 his wife Suzanne, who was there at the time.

What we're

12 trying to do is try and recover as much of that
13 $9,000,000 and the liquidators are trying to recover as
14 much of that as possible. They are only secured creditor
15 in the water park, and they are owed probably 90% or 70%
16 of the unsecured claims.

It was a largest creditor by

17 far.
18

There was a bankruptcy claim and there's a

19 negotiated claim that was put into effect that the park
20 be sold and that allowed Southern American Insurance
21 Company liquidation to credit it's secured claim in that
22 plan.
23

The plan was extended -- by that, they had it

24 extended, I'm sorry, on July 31st of this year.

As you

25 well know there was a sale, or bidding, occurred, and
16
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1 the bid was approved

in that sale.

The whole sale

set

2 aside by Jeff Clark. Ever since then they've tried

to

3 sell the park or have BCD sell the park in an effort
4 comply with that bankruptcy claim that offered

every

5 term and do whatever they can to try to thwart that
6

We have the second bid process with Peak

to

bid.

Investment

7 being the highest bidder. Golfland bid $3,040,000

at

8 that time.

money

They were unable to come up with that

9 many and Golfland refused

to continue at that time

10 the $ 3 , 0 4 0 , 0 0 0 , we are now here.
11 attempted

to market

14

has

in this park has one concern,

is, whether they can get title
The problem

has

this property and everybody who

12 expressed an interest
13 that

The liquidator

with

and

insurance.

is the appeal Golfland

filed in Judge

15 Clark's ruling. We have not been able to find a title
16 company that would be willing to ensure around
17 a p p e a l , and so that appeal
18 on the bidding.

that

is having a chilling

There is no question that that

affect
would

19 h a p p e n .
20

We work with a trade for BCD, BCD sought

21 day for the plan completion extended

to have

from July 31st

22 order to wait out the appeal period, for

the
in

Golfland.

23 Golfland objected to that, and amazingly they
24 to t h a t , to the additional time to have that
25| And now they are coming back and objecting

objected
completed.

to having
17
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the

1 plan completed as per it's terms.

And I think it should

2 be abundantly clear on one reason and that is because
3 they chill all of our bids and they eliminate all of the
4 competing bids, including that of Southern American
5 Insurance Company as a secured claimant.
6

Now, in their latest filing they argued that, in

7 fact, this motion may be unnecessary if Golfland is
8 being sincere in what they said in their motion to
9 continue, which was they don't intend to credit that
10 sale on Wednesday. If that were true, then we would not
11 need additional cash to proceed with this sale, but in
12 order to protect against the contingencies we were
13 required to seek the approval in this court and proceed
14 in that fashion.
15

This park has been operated now by BCD with a

16 manger, Paul Beck, and Southern American Insurance
17 Company were to acquire this park and sell, we would
18 continue with that engagement to engage Mr. Paul Beck as
19a
20

manager.
On the last couple of years since it has been out of

21 the control of the Orchards', this department has
22 enhanced the value significantly of this and it has been
23 very profitable. Last year $500,000 was projected, this
24 year it would be $700,000, and all of that money is to
25| the benefit of the BCD creditors.

And now Golfland
18
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1 wants to make certain that this somehow goes to the 7th
2 or now they're putting us in the position where we have
3 to buy it now.

And after the sale then it becomes the

4 Southern American Insurance Company.

I don't understand

!

5 the philosophy behind Valley Asphalt and Golfland trying

I

6 to force us so we can all proceed from the sale and try
7 to take it.
8

The only objection that I think we need to address

9 in this matter, because all the other objections will be
10 addressed in the bankruptcy court at some point, and
11 that is, whether we have properly proceeded in this
12 manner.

Whether the liquidator has properly proceeded

13 in this manner.

And I would refer the Court to the

14 Powers of the Liquidators Code. In section 31-A-27-314
15 and it enumerates all the powers of the liquidator. And
16 number six says that the liquidator may collect all
17 debts and claims due and money belonging to the insurer,
18 and then it goes on at the end, and pursue any creditors
19 available to enforce this claim.
20 in this particular case.

That's all we're doing

Understand this, I think it's

21 important, that Golfland says that the offer that the
22 liquidator has made of bankruptcy is so untenical that
23 they don't intend to proceed with an offer on their own,
24 at least the conditions.
25

What the liquidator is accomplishing is a
19
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1 foreclosure.

In a foreclosure we won't get

title

2 insurance, we won't get environmental w a r r a n t i e s , we
3 won't get any of those things that we agreed to waive
4 this proceeding and we're credit bidding, and the
5 is, we're foreclosing and we are taking
6 conditions.

in

fact

those

And the other effect is we now have

this

7 property out at two different court p r o c e e d i n g s , we now
8 have it here in this court, where if we operate

it and

9 get it out of this court's proceeding direction,
10 benefit of our creditors.
11 creditors

in subsection

6.

12 argues that in subsection
13 proceeded

We're just pursuing
Golfland

16 this property

and

9, that the liquidator

14 the property worth a value exceeding
15 this Court's authority.

our

comes back

improperly because any transaction
$25,000

And they argue that

for the

has

involving
requires
because

is a large amount of money in excess of

17 $25,000, anything we do with the property requires

this

18 Court's authority. Required authority from this court.
19 That simply can't be the reading of that provision,
20 because

that would mean in time there's an asset

21 available out there at a value of $25,000, there
22 one thing we can do. We can't conclude
23 transactions.

isn't

any

We couldn't buy a postage stamp

because

24 the property's worth $25,000 or more than that, and if
25| concluded

any transaction subject to that property we
20
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1 want to set up an empire we have to come to this court.
2

The proper reading of that p r o v i s i o n , and let me

3 back u p , the other thing that Golfland's argument
4 is superimposes number 9 of the Powers of

does

the

5 L i q u i d a t o r , and that's not how this provision

is read.

6

that

The other aspect

7 section

is the proper reading of

is, any time the liquidator puts at

risk

8 p r o p e r t y of this estate over $ 2 5 , 0 0 0 , that's when we
9 need to come to this court and get a p p r o v a l .
10

B u t , in any event, we're here, and we're asking

11 Court on behalf of the liquidator to approve

the use of

12 cash in this estate to enhance the bid. Why?
13 know the property's worth more than 2.2
14 d o l l a r s .

Golfland

the

Because

million

is issuing 3 million d o l l a r s . We

have

15 an offer for 3 million. We've talked to other people
16 are interested

in that amount

we

in excess of 2.2

17 dollars and we can't sell it because of the

who

million

title

18 insurance.
19

So in order to comply with the plan, and that's

20 we're doing

all

is complying with the bankruptcy plan, we'll

21 proceed with the offer to the BCD Corporation,

the

22 debtor under the confirmed plan, in a credit bid, and
23 this Court's authority to enhance that bid, because
24 of that money, not all, comes back to the

most

business

25| e s t a t e , and we are a talking about $ 8 0 0 , 0 0 0 .
21
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in

1
2
3

THE COURT: Okay.

Thank you, Mr. Carlile.

Mr.

Shields?
MR. SHIELDS: Your Honor, 25 percent of what Mr.

4 Carlile talked about was facts.
5 up here arguing facts.
6 Facts that

What he's doing,

he's

Facts that are in dispute.

I think refer the Court to make a poor

7 judgment, and I think you need to see the other side of
8 those facts.

The rule requires when you want to argue

9 facts at hearings you file an affidavit or you cite to
10 the record where those facts are placed
11 answers to interrogatories.
12 citation

in this case.

I'm

-- depositions,

We have no record of
citing to rule 4501, subpart

13 1, that says you file a motion, you file a memorandum,
14 you appoint authority, you file an affidavit
15 facts. We don't have a single affidavit

for your

in this case.

16 Yet, what Mr. Carlile argues is the v a l u e s , what's
17 to happen in the bankruptcy court, how much the

going

property

18 is worth, whether the bidders we have, the creditors

in

19 that case, whether or not their claim to be
20 insubordinate, that's lots of issues that relate
21 facts that

to

I think this Court needs to hear before

they

22 rule.
23

That's what concerned us about the short notice of

24 the hearing.

There is no record the only record

you

25 could get is through having evidence and yet we don't
22
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1 have any evidence. Golfland does not admit to the facts
2 Mr. -Carlile speaks about.

We don't agree that they're

3 trying to sell his property, not according to the plan.
4 This Court will review the plan and you will review the
5 sale tht they're proposing, and their substantial
6 differences and we'll present these to the bankruptcy
7 court and there will be another hearing in the
8 bankruptcy court to consider those issues.
9

What we think it's disingenuous for him to stand up

10 here and say all those facts, undisputed, go ahead
11 Judge, and you can rule because this is the issue for
12 what this estate needs. I don't think that is how this
13 court should proceed.
14

There is some substantial issues about the validity

15 as I see it. The main right the Golfer has, SAIC stands
16 in a conflict of position. Several months after the
17 bankruptcy was filed for BCD, SAIC, through a stock
18 transaction, acquired the ownership.

Mr. Leonard told

19 me that the liquidation has to be issued to SEC
20 creditors.

It also has to be issued to the BCD

21 creditors.

And what's happened is that over the last

22 few months he's neglected his duties to the BCD
23 creditors to try and get the SEC permits.

He should

24 have gotten independent trustee permits in the meantime,
25 when he could have done it.
23
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1

For example, Mr. Leonard Stillman had his deposition

2 taken. One of the questions that was asked was, how do
3 you value the allocation of your property versus
4 personal property, because as SAIC admits in their
5 pleadings, they only have a lien on real estate, they
6 don't have a lien to personal property.

Yet a

7 substantial value of that property is personal property.
8 In fact, BCD has also scheduled a compromise with Utah
9 County that says 50 percent of the value of the water
10 park is personal property. Now, 50 percent of the value
11 of the water park is personal property in that sense he
12 doesn't only owe on real property, they can't credit it
13 half the value of the water property.
14 cash.

They have to use

But it you read the offer in this motion, they've

15 assumed that all money to this is going to be
16 accredited, but I asked Mr. Stillman how do you intend
17 to allocate the difference between real and personal
18 property?
19 issue.

He said he really never thought of that

Well, the creditors of BCD certainly thought of

20 that issue, because if they don't have a lien on the
21 personal, and half of water property is personal, 1.1
22 million of his bid price would be half, if they don't
23 have to pay the other creditor.
24

THE COURT: This argument you're going to have to

25| make in the bankruptcy court more properly there.
24
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1

MR. SHIELDS: I agree. But I think the point is,

2 there are significant factual issues.

And I don't think ^

3 this court should make a determination that don't worry,
4 SAIC has 96 percent of all the money you will get back.
5 I just don't think that's accurate.
6

Your Honor, all the facts they allegedly made

7 $500,000 last year, and they're going to make $700,000
8 this year. In the deposition I asked Mr. Stillman, "What
9 is your net profit this year? " He said, "We're at a
10 slight loss. We anticipate making a big profit at the
11 end of the year but we don't know for sure." You know,
12 ruling based on these allegations rather than fact, I
13 think, is premature. SAIC attempted paying involvement
14 of this nasty person's going to hold up for the sale.
15

Your Honor, we have a sale.

We contracted to buy

16 this property at a price over a year and a half ago and
17 the whole merits of our lawsuit about whether SAIC
18 wrongfully pulled out of that contract because they
19 thought they could sell it for more. And the merits of
20 that case are very important.

They can't get title

21 insurance because we have the claim, and that claim -22 that interest, and that interest cannot be wiped out by
23 the order of the bankruptcy court order plan.

And

24 therefore, we can't put our (inaudible) until that
25 decision has been rendered and that claim has been made,
25
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1 decision rendered, and then it will be a true sale. This
2 is not going to be a true bid next Wednesday.

What

3 they're going to do they are going to go over

the

4 conditions on that bid are going to be so uneven,

that

~~5 no one will bid. You won't get title insurance. All
6 you're doing is buying the lawsuit, if SAIC bought
7 all they're doing is buying another lawsuit that
8 already have with
9

they

Golfland.

We agree with you on the fact that the

10 court

it,

bankruptcy

should hear all these things. We also agree

the

11 bankruptcy court will not approve the sale, so we

think

12 this motion is premature.
13

Another problem that shows the difference

between

14 BCD and SAIC, they have alleged in the motion, if you
15 would read it, that they have the right to credit
16 another lienholder who is in a similar position
17 Valley A s p h a l t . They purchased
18 furnished

the supply,

to

they

the ice rink that the water park used in the

19 winter for skating.

Up until Leonard Stillman

20 control of BCD there was a big dispute. Last

took

December

21 when SAIC caused BCD to file a motion to modify
22 plan, Burley
23 arguments

bid

the

(sp?) came in and raised some of the

I have raised in conflict of interests

same
that

24 either the hearing, SAIC buys the lien from Burley,
25 one of the deals was that Burley was withdraw

and

their
26
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1 objections

to the modification.

SAIC has tried

to

2 modify their plans on two different motions and we
3 believe this motion formally

-- we believe this

4 to approve the sale as a third attempt
5 plan.

to modify

the

Every time that they try to modify the plan it is

6 exclusively
7 creditor.

for the benefit of SAIC and detriment
And that's why Burley objected, and

8 why they bought

the claim

of

filed

for less

than

it's value and they're telling this Court they

11 credit

the

that's

their claim right before Burley

9 the objection. Then they bought
10 half

motion

it over $215,000. We don't believe that's

12 case, and I don't think Judge Clark is going to

can

the
allow

13 him to buy a claim at a discount, and after they

bought

14 it and disputed that BCD should continue to d i s p u t e .
15 And after they bought

it and all of a sudden drop

16 dispute

and take a position that now that it

17 benefit

the SAIC, there is no reason to continue

the

doesn't
this

18 d i s p u t e .
19

In the response of the demand

file, when they

20 there's no risk of anybody to insubordinate
21 yet we now have Valley Asphalt

our

say

claim,

in this court having

the

22 right to consider whether they have the right to stay
23 for insubordination,
24 insubordination

I think it's substantial

for SAIC's claim.

risk of

We do not believe

25| the sale of the best priced of the estates because

of
27
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in

1 term of their associated weapon including the lack of
2 any kind of title insurance.
3

Finally, your Honor, we're not sure that they should

4 be in the business of operating the water park on a long
5 term basis. My client owns many water parks throughout
6 the Western United States.

We know the risk involved,

7 you make money some years and in other years you don't.
8 Depending on what happens with accidents and other
9 things it's a risky business. We don't think it's
10 appropriate for a liquidator to ban the liquidation
11 business and get into the water park operations.
12 Particularly when the motivation is to deprive Golfland
13 of it's remedy.
14

What they've alleged in the bankruptcy court again,

15 and we disagree with, is that what they conduct this
16 sale to be free and clear of the interest in the
17 Golfer.

We don't think that's true, but if it is true,

18 all they are trying to do is to deprive us of that
19 remedy. We don't think that's proper in the course,
2 0 thank you.
21

THE COURT: We have denied the motion to continue the

22 hearing date, and I'm going to authorize the liquidator
23 to use cash in excess of $25,000 in connection with the
24 bid.

And also to use the bid that assumes the senior

25 tax claims.

We'll see you all again next week.
28
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1

April 17, 1995

2

*****

3
4

THE COURT: I'm

5 Supposing

just thinking of the

complications.

I rule that that hearing and that

testimony

6 will declare estoppel and that the p r e c o n d i t i o n s

for the

7 sale didn't occur, and so you go ahead and sell to the
8 highest bidder, and you immediately
9 Sam reverses Judge Clark's.

sell and then

Judge

Probably still could

be

10 handled, but it might be simpler to w a i t .
11

MR. CARLILE: W e l l ,

I think with that argument

12 appeal that we need to recognize
13 reversal

to Judge Clark

the standard

15 factual

for

-- or Judge Sam and that

14 going to be in the use of discretion and also

and

is

the

issues, that the likelihood of him doing that

16 so remote that there is very little risk for this
17 to proceed today.

Although

I do understand what

is

Court
the

18 Court's concern is.
19

THE COURT: Do you believe that a decision

20 Court
21

is

in that

eminent?

MR. CARLILE: I don't believe

22 b a n k r u p t c y

appeals, I'm

23 hasn't been calendared

-- I don't do enough

a little surprised
already because

that

it

it's been

briefed

24 now for several m o n t h s , and I know what the calendar
25| on appeals courts, as you do also, but I'm

not

is

certain
29
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in

1 of what it is in terms of Judge Sam's hearing

for

2 bankruptcy m a t t e r s . So I would venture a guess and

say

3 that hopefully there would be a decision soon, no more
4 oral argument on that.
5

THE COURT: Go ahead.

6

MR. CARLILE: Your Honor, first

I want to address

our

7 motion and then address this issue about whether

it's

8 appropriate

the

9 liquidator

for them to file a complaint

against

in this proceeding, or to try to sue the

10 liquidator as an officer of BCD or CDX.
11 said in our pleadings, it's important

And as we have

to keep

that

12 distinction clear. That the liquidator has his
13 responsibilities

to the creditors and so does

American

14 Insurance Company and as an officer of BCD or CDX has
15 it's responsibilities
16 bankruptcy estates.
17 become blurred
18 I'll

those

We don't want that distinction

in the least for this proceeding.

address the reason that becomes

19 complaint
20

to the creditors of

important

to

And

in the

in just a moment.

Mr. Shields argues that what's at stake here is the

21 integrity of a court order, the approval of the sale.
22 And

I disagree with that in the sense that the

court

23 order has no integrity, because the terms that were
24 presented

to the Court for approval were not the

25 that Golfland

sought to impose and to enforce

terms

in the
30
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1 supplemental

agreement.

Judge Stirba did not know

2 the c o n c e s s i o n s , Judge Clark did not know about

about

the

3 concessions.
4

He further goes on to argue that the judicial

5 that we have a duty, or that it was somehow
6 for the liquidator

--

nefarious

in his capacity as liquidator of

7 or an officer of these other two estates to go and
8 to Golfland.
9 mentioned

W e l l , the liquidator and the

talk

debtor

in those actual confirmed plans that

it has a

10 duty to the Court, and has a duty to the back-up
11 to keep him informed because those are Court
12 There

SAIC

bidder

approved.

is nothing nefarious about going to that

back-up

13 there and saying we're having trouble with the

primary

14 bidder and this is the area that a concern has arisen.
15 In fact, it's appropriate
16 not to do that.

and it would be

And so everything

17 did in that context

inappropriate

that the

liquidator

really was in the preservation

18 the integrity of the process having orders entered
19 did not
20

fully disclose that the Court's

The difference

22 d i f f e r e n c e .

As I explained

that

(inaudible).

in the chain of position of

21 liquidator, as Mr. Shields calls it, 180

and

the

degree

in the initial argument, Mr.

23 S t o n e , at that point when he was making a deposition
24 testimony which really was that they had waived
25 w a r r a n t y .

Why?

Because he believed

the

that they had
31
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of

1 misunderstood what they had.
2

THE COURT:

Mr. Carlile, the fact that the party

3 takes inconsistent positions
4 bother me at all.
5

in the proceedings

doesn't

You don't need to waste time on that

issue.

6

MR. CARLILE: I do want to say that 2.71

7 dollars

is not what's striking u s .

million

The position

is

8 what's striking u s .
9

THE COURT: It almost seems like someone discovered a

10 gold mine to have that amount, you know.
11

MR. SHIELDS: Well, one thing we do know is that

the

12 appraisals were wrong.
13

THE COURT: I think so.

14

MR. SHIELDS: And there's a great deal of

interest,

15 and at this point the interest that has been

expressed

16 is the liquidator
17 separate

is willing to sell the barn and

from the water park because there now

18 to be a market

shed

appears

for that, so that they would not be

19 isolated on the shed, cannot be sold separately.

It is

20 a quarter and it is landlocked and so whoever buys
21 barn buys the

the

shed.

22

The issue about the negotiations with Provo City.

23 All

I would say in that respect

24 Golfland had failed.

is that the deal

with

At that point the liquidator

was

25| exercising his duty to find people who are interested
32
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in

1 buying this property.
2 expressed an interest

We approached
in purchasing

anybody who
that

had

property,

3 including Golfland, who said yeah, that they would
4 willing to do, and Doug Lawson on behalf of

be

the

5 liquidator said that we think we need to get a new

court

6 order because the old deal is not there. We got to get a
7 supplemental

order.

And Dave waived the conditions

8 the

closing.

9

We are still down to the three issues that have

of

not

10 been addressed by Golfland. The reason that there was a
11 failure of getting bankruptcy
12 simultaneous

sale, is not because there was

13 going on with Mr.
14 because

court approval

(inaudible) and Mr.

for

this

negotiations

(inaudible),

there was a chain of concessions made

to

15 Golfland which Pete disagreed with, and that was
16 in the bankruptcy

but

filed

court. The cause of that failure

was

17 Golfland.
18

Second

19 q u e s t i o n ,

issue is the tender, there is just
it's matter of law.

no

You look at that

20 there was no complete unconditional

tender of

letter,

the

21 p r i c e .
22

And third, they failed to close on the day that

it

23 was scheduled

to close and we offered to close on April

24 8th, so there

is no agreement

25

in force.

Now, let me just talk to the Court briefly

about
33
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1 filing a complaint.

I find it interesting

that

2 what we're now arguing is that we ought to have
3 evidentiary hearing.
4 hearing.

We have had the

well,
an

evidentiary

Judge Clark heard the evidence

for three

5 and has made a determination based on those facts
6 findings.

It would be inconsistent

for this

7 contrary to the principles of res judicata
8 estoppel

Court

collateral

result.

Now, looking at the complaint

that they

have

11 proposed, and if the Court's had an opportunity
12 review that, you basically have the

to

specific

13 p e r f o r m a n c e , breach of contract, and the
14 claim.

and

to re-hear those issues and running the risk of

9 having an inconsistent
10

days

negligence

If you have read carefully the negligence

claim

15 it says, there's a duty on the part of the liquidator
16 proceed

to the Court prior to closing.

17 contract.

Where does the duty arise?

18 this contract.
19 claim.

to

That's a
It arises out of

Every claim they have got is a contract

Not one of those claims gets to the

liquidator

20 as an individual.
21

There are contract claims of BCD and CDX but not

22 liquidator and those are appropriate.
23 claim, and those are appropriate

the

They have got a

in this proceeding.- But

24 they cannot get the liquidator individually on a breach
25 of contract

claim, and if there's a report, there's a
34
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1 possibility, but not a breach of contract claim.
2

The other issue is that these issues are resolved in

3 two judicial proceedings.
4 today.

One is the one we're having

If this Court determines that we ought to do the

5 sale of Golfland, and as Mr. Shields acknowledges and is
6 quoting a statement, it basically goes away.
7 Court determines that the sale of the

If this

(inaudible) by

8 Judge Stirba is a sale different from the one that was
9 sought to be closed by Golfland, then it closed out the
10 issue also, because there was no Court approval and so
11 we -- the liquidator, acted appropriately.
12

So as to Southern American Insurance Company, this

13 proceeding resolved all of those claims.

As to the

14 bankruptcy proceedings, then the appeal is now in front
15 of Judge Sam to resolve all of those claims, so there is
16 simply no reason to have a separate complaint.

But we

17 think it's just another attempt to try to leverage the
18 liquidator into agreeing with Golfland's position.
19

The jurisdictional issue.

There is no Court in this

20 country that ought to have more or greater interest in
21 the activities of the liquidator than this Court. Not
22 bankruptcy court, it's this court.

Exclusive

23 jurisdiction of all those proceedings is in this court.
I

V

24 The order was entered in, liquidation indicated that all
25| claims against the liquidator and liquidation of the
35
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1 estate are to be filed in this Court. And there's no
2 exception to that.
3

Mr. Shields says there's a difference between

4 pre-liquidation and post -liquidation. There's no support
5 of that statement. And if there's anything going on that
6 ought not to be going on with the liquidator, then it is
7 the interest of this court to supervise that.

So that

8 if there ever is a claim, it ought to be in this case.
9

Furthermore, the claim against the estate is not the

10 liquidator himself and so that's got to come through
11 this court, through some kind of a claim which I'm
12 assuming would an administrative claim, if they were
13 able to prevail.

Again, if there were a tort action it

14 would be something else, we would have to research
15 that.
16

The other issue on that is in the (inaudible).

It

17 is clear that the business of insurance is left to the
18 states. It's not to the federal courts. And so it's this
19 court, if there's ever a claim.

And we've also briefed

20 the issue of no jurisdiction.
21

But your Honor, the entire issue is resolved in this

22 proceeding and with Judge Sam and there is no reason to
23 have leave given to file a claim against the liquidator.
24

THE COURT: Okay.

Anything further?

25

MR. SHIELDS: Quickly, your Honor, yes.
36
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1

I got a call from Judge Sam's clerk a few days

2 about another matter and I said,
3 appeal?

"Where are we on that

" And he said it was in a pile with a bunch of

4 bankruptcy

appeals

in the same period of time and we

5 just haven't gotten to it quite y e t .

So I'm

expecting

6 that we'll get some ruling or notice of that, or
7 on that, quite
8

hearing

soon.

As to the claim of estoppel, these are really

9 separate
10 addressed

issues.

issues, but we weren't

12 in the bankruptcy

quite

The issues in our complaints were

to the bankruptcy court here.

11 some related

court.

I admit

suing the

liquidator

We were on the same side

that the sale should be approved.

15 alleging

in this complaint

16 their duty of good faith in the contract
17 has been no ruling by Judge Clark.
18 specifically

found the

21 extent

in bankruptcy

24 on the issue
25 i s s u e s .

He said,

But we didn't know the

They're two

Clark

I don't
I see

full
So I don't
and

court on appeal can be

in the claims.

Different

There

In fact, Judge

of the facts until after the hearing.

23 litigated

the

breached

to u s .

22 think there's any way that the issues raised

as

we're

(inaudible) and he said,

19 find any fraud here or any bad guys.
20 some m i s u n d e r s t a n d i n g .

What

is that they have

not

there's

13 them. We were on the same side to try to convince
14 Court

ago

estopped

different

adversary and cause of action. And
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1 even though some of the facts are related,
2 goes a little bit with the comment that the

I think

that

inconsistent

3 positions taken by the liquidator are facts. It's not
4 law.

It's okay for a party to take one position,

5 the facts, that's

-- they cannot come from under

but
what

6 they said about the agreement with Golfland and the
7 liquidator.

And in further support of that

8 quote briefly from the transcript

I'm going

about the closing

to

that

9 they say we have not addressed the issue about the -10 three

issues of why we didn't close the way in closing

11 and I think

it's a simultaneous matter.

This is Mr.

12 Monson responding to questions by Pete's attorney.

The

13 question is:
14

Q.

In connection with doing your work

15

these it would be necessary to implement

16

terms of auction and the order; did you

17

indicate to anyone that you understood

18

closing would take place in two weeks?

19

A.

I had discussions with Steve's

the
ever

that

the

attorney

20

for Golfland

21

have indicated to him our interpretation

of

22

closing

deposit

23

the funds, the purchase price and escrow. "

24

following the auction.

on

I believe I

in two weeks was that they would

That was done within two weeks of the purchase

price

25| and the barn was still there.
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1

A n o t h e r question on page 85 of the

2

Q.

transcript:

And so in your view, Golfland

complied

3

with that provision that it closed within

4

weeks of the time of the

5

A.

That it deposit

6

Q.

Well,

answer?

its money in escrow.

it closes in two weeks of the

7

of the auction in the phrase used in this

8

language

9

A.

letter

-- the phrase that's

seller was to provide that it be

11

(inaudible) . "
That happened, your Honor.

13 allegation

time

used?

My view was that the obligation of

10

12

two

the

deposited

We believe there's

in support of the factual claim that

no

they

14 can't comply with that provision of the contract.
15

As to the simultaneous

16 addressed

that.

17 adequately
18 happened

I think

addressed

closing,

I have

(inaudible) but

the simultaneous

adequately

I think

I've

closing. But

after Pete filed the motion with water

what

park?

19 There was never any motion filed in CBX or this case.
20 Those orders still stand, even if those orders
21 stand

-- even in this Court's

still

(inaudible) pro se, if

22 they plan to sell the share of the bond together
23 have to go back to the bankruptcy court and get
24 bankruptcy

they
CDX

court approval to sell the share because

25| isn't before your Honor.

It was the same argument

that
that
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1 they made with Judge Clark. So, we were led to believe
2 that the simultaneous closing provision was going to be
3 waived but it wasn't waived until they had the
4 from Provo City.

That's when we first

authority

learned that

they

5 were going to bring this up.
6

Finally, your Honor, the appeal before Judge Sam is

7 not an abuse of discretion.
8 issue.

We argue it's an

The Judge misunderstood

9 in his ruling.

this judicial

illegal
principle

He talks about the price, and we

believe

10 that the standards that will be used there is just
11 preponderance

of the evidence because

12 issue. If the judge misunderstands

the

it's a legal

the concept of what's

13 the issue before me, am I supposed to be looking at a
14 shock and conscience

standard, or am I supposed

15 giving as much money as I can because it's the
16 Ironically,
17 followed

to be
state?

the liquidator never arranged that issue, we

the supplemental memo just a few days

before

18 the hearing, but they never raised it at the opening.
19 Very critical point, we think.
20

Golfland

is not in concession.

21 Court to prove anything different

We're not asking
than what the

22 already proved, we're just asking for the order
23 liquidator to proceed
24 controversy

in the second.

the

Court's
for

If we have

about this we would come back to the Court,

25 but we're not going to have any controversy.

Golfland
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1 and the liquidator have agreed upon the terms of
2 sale.

The only issue we have is this closing

3 They're

the

thing.

saying because we didn't close any of the

days,

4 which was the day after Pete filed the motion that
5 should be out from under that sale.

Obviously,

they

they

6 waived that provision by continuing to negotiate with us
7 and there's no provision about the
8 closing.

They can't

9 anybody except
10

for

simultaneous

force the simultaneous

to not

the liquidators motion to sell the proposed

12 city, and grant the alternative m o t i o n .
13 glad to accept

to

Golfland.

Thank you, your Honor, we would ask the Court

11 grant

to the

And we would

that or the alternative motion to

14 with the claim filed.
15

closing

be

comply

Thank you, your Honor.

MR. CARLILE: I think

I'll

take a couple minutes

if I

16 may.
17

I'm

thinking of the effect of Judge Sam's ruling

18 you need to understand
19 could

that

I don't believe that

tender an adequate price of what

20 Sam or for a failure to close on April
21 necessarily

in front of Judge Sam.

is before

and

you
Judge

9th is

Judge Sam is a third

22 issue so this Court could make a ruling under at
23 those two years and not be concerned about

least

whether

24 there's going to be an inconsistency with what kind of a
25 ruling Judge Sam p r o v i d e s .
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1

Now, those two issues, your Honor, I've

2 addressed

adequately

the tender on the conditions, that there

were

3 conditions.
4

On April 8th, we offered to close on the barn

and

5 the shed separately, they knew at that point we were
6 willing to separate those properties and waive a
7 simultaneous

closing.

8 until the hearing.

They said no, we want to wait

We entered negotiations based on the

9 operating agreement which extended that closing date

and

10 they told us on June 1 they weren't going to sign the
11 operating agreement.
12 there was no further
13

The time for closing expired

and

obligation.

THE COURT: Counsel, I'm

ready to rule.

14
25

• *** *

16
17
18
19

20
21
22
23
24
25|
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

IN RE:

) CIVIL NO. 920901617

SOUTHERN AMERICAN
INSURANCE COMPANY,

) HELD:

APRIL 17, 1995

Respondent.

BE IT REMEMBERED, that the above-entitled case
came on for hearing in the Third Judicial District
Court, 240 East 400 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on
April 17, 1995 before the Honorable Judge Stephen L.
Henriod.
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Attorney at Law
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10 East South Temple
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COMMISSIONER:
CRAIG CARLILE
Attorney at Lav
RAY, QUINNEY 6 NEBEKER
79 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84145-0385

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
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1

April

17,

1995

2

3

£&&£££.H11L££.

4
5

THE COURT:

I'm ready to rule.

I find that

6

the sale in question was contingent on conditions

7

which never occurred.

8

with the strings that Golfland attached to it does

9

not amount to the proper tender with respect to

I am finding that the tender

10

closing.

11

fashion, and that the simultaneous nature of the

12

closing was frustrated by the bankruptcy court order,

13

so, therefore, there was no agreement, and the terms

14

that Judge Stirba approved in her order were not

15

terms of the sale, so that order is, likewise,

16

ineffective.

17

that parcel, as far as this court is concerned, to

18

the highest and best offer.

19

Provo or Golfland or that new bidder, but assume that

20

the process will go on.

21

I

The closing didn't occur in a timely

So the liquidator can go on and sell

MR. CARLILE:

I'm not limiting you to

If I may, Your Honor, we have

22

noticed all the people who have an interest in that

23

property and, as I indicated, we have received a

24

higher bid, and we felt that, depending on how this

25

court ruled today, we would proceed to do a bid today

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328*1188
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1

here in the courtroom, if permissible from the court,

2

and I think those bidders are available and willing

3

to proceed.

4

and they allowed us to go ahead and do the bid.

5

Whether you wanted to do the bid yourself or conduct

6

the bid or just supervise or leave while we do it and

7

come back

8
9

We did this once in the bankruptcy court

~
THE COURT:

Hold on, Mr. Carlile.

I think

I foreclosed on this same property once back in the

10

late 70's, so go ahead and conduct your sale.

11

also going to grant Golfland's motion, though, to

12

file a complaint, and I do not think this real estate

13

is so unique that dollar damages in the event that

14

you're successful with the complaint would not be

15

satisfactory and sufficient.

16

this court, though.

17

MR. SHIELDS:

I am

I'd like it filed in

I will, Your Honor.

Could

18

we ask —

19

Mr. —

20

these other bidders and they mentioned they were

21

going to try to sell here.

22

that, emd particularly if they plan to sell the shed

23

with it, again, I think they need to have the

24

bankruptcy court approval on that.

25

I'm not quite sure we got copies of where

one of the counsel for the liquidators sent to

THE COURT:

We got sworn notice of

I think Golfland needs to be

RBNEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1

part of this next sale and I think they have to have

2

adequate notice.

3

MR. CARLILE:

4

be part of the sale.

5

though.

6

We agree that they ought to

We would need adequate notice,

THE COURT:

Well, if you can work something

7

out, information exchange out, or you can get a

8

waiver on that, otherwise you may need to do it at a

9

different time.

10

MR. CARLILE:

We can work that out.

11

MR. SHIELDS:

Let me just ask, do you

12
13

intend to sell the shed with the barn property?
I

MR. CARLILE: Yes.

14

MR. SHIELDS:

15

And is there a court order

from the bankruptcy court?

16

MR. CARLILE:

17

court —

18

sale.

19

It would be subject to the

bankruptcy court approving that simultaneous

MR. SHIELDS:

20

I wasn't aware that there was

the shed bankruptcy court approval that you say.

21

THE COURT:

I WOULD LIKE (INAUDIBLE) TO

22

prepare a note on their motion and I'd like you to

23

prepare am order on your motion.

24
25

I

MR. SHIELDS:

Okay.

In the order he's

recited that the complaints are filed in this court?

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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1

THE COURT:

2

MR. SHIELDS:

3

THE COURT:

4

Yes.
okay.
Okay.
*

* *

Thank you.
Thank you, counsel
*

5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25

RENEE L. STACY, CSR, RPR
(801) 328-1188
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CRAIG CARLILE (A0571)
DOUGLAS M. MONSON (A2293) and
BRENT D. WRIDE (A5163) of
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER
Attorneys for Utah Insurance
Commissioner, as Liquidator of
Southern American Insurance Company
79 South Main Street
P. 0. BOX 45385
Salt LaJce City, Utah 84145-0385
Telephone: (801) 532-1500
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

In re:
Southern American Insurance
Company,

ORDER APPROVING SALE OF
SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING
FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS,
INTERESTS AND ENCUMBRANCES

Respondent,

Civil No. 920901617
Judge Stephen Henriod

The "Liquidator's Motion for Supplemental Order
Approving Sale of Southern American Insurance Company
Headquarters Building Free and Clear of Liens, Interests, and
Encumbrances" came on for hearing on Monday, April 17, 1995
before the Court, the Honorable Stephen L. Henriod, District
Judge, presiding.

The Utah Insurance Commissioner, as Liquidator

(••Liquidator11) of Southern American Insurance Company ("SAIC")
was represented by Craig Carlile and Douglas M. Monson of Ray,
Quinney & Nebeker.

Golfland Entertainment Centers, Inc.

(••Golfland") , which filed an Objection to the Liquidator's

Addendum — Page

Motion, was represented by Jeffrey L. Shields and Zachary Shields
of Callister, Nebeker & McCullough.

No evidence was taken at the

hearing; evidence was submitted with the pleadings. After
hearing the arguments of counsel and considering the pleadings
and other matters submitted to this Court, this Court makes the
following findings:
1.

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 5 31A-27-314(9) , the

Liquidator seeks this Court's approval for the sale of the SAIC
headquarters building and excess property (the "SAIC Barnw).

The

legal description of the SAIC Barn is attached as Exhibit A and
incorporated herein.
2.

The sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland which was

previously approved by Judge Stirba was contingent upon
conditions which never occurred.
3.

Golfland's tender of the purchase funds for the

SAIC Barn with the strings that Golf land attached to it did not
amount to the proper tender with respect to closing.
4.

The closing of the sale of the SAIC Barn to

GoIfland did not occur in a timely fashion.
5.

The requirement for the sale of the SAIC Barn to

Golf land for a simultaneous closing of the sale of the BCD Water
Park was frustrated by an order of the United States Bankruptcy
Court for the District of Utah, so therefore there was no
agreement•
-2-
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Judge Stirba's February 24, 1994 Order authorizing

the sale of the SAIC Barn to Golfland is ineffective because the
terms of sale that Judge Stirba approved in her Order were not
the terms of the sale that was frustrated by the Bankruptcy Court
Order.
7.

The SAIC Barn is not so unique that dollar damages

in the event that Golfland is successful in its complaint against
the Liquidation Estate would not be satisfactory and sufficient.
Based upon the foregoing findings, the Court hereby
ORDERS as follows:
A.

The Liquidator is hereby authorized to sell the

SAIC Barn for the highest and best offer to be approved by this
Court after an auction to be conducted by the Liquidator.
B.

The sale of the SAIC Barn is not limited to either

Provo City or Golfland or the new bidders.
C.

The Liquidator shall provide adequate notice of the

auction of the SAIC Barn to Golfland and provide Golfland an
opportunity to bid at such auction.
D.

The sale of the SAIC Barn real property (described

in Exhibit "A" attached hereto) is free and clear of all liens
and encumbrances, with any valid liens and encumbrances to attach
to the proceeds of the sale in their respective priorities.

-3-
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DATED this

2- day °*

__. 1995,

BY THE COURT:

The Honorable Stephen L. Henriod
ftdstrict Judge
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE OF 8ERVTCB
I hereby certify that true and correct copies of the
foregoing ORDER APPROVING SALE OF SOUTHERN AMERICAN INSURANCE
COMPANY HEADQUARTERS BUILDING FREE AND CLEAR OF LIENS, INTERESTS
AND ENCUMBRANCES were served by United States first class mail,
postage prepaid, this _/£_ day of QA^L^.
j. Ray Barrios
Assistant Attorney General
50 South Main Street, Suite 900
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Michael F. Skolnick
KIPP & CHRISTIAN
175 East 400 South, #330
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Ted Boyer
CLYDE, PRATT & SNOW
201 South Main Street, Suite 1000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2208
Jeffrey L. Shields
CALLISTER, DUNCAN 6 NEBEKER
10 East South Temple, /800
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Harold Reiser
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN i DUNN
370 East South Temple, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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1995, to:

Mona Lyman
MCKAY, BURTON 6 THURMAN
10 East South Temple, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Kim R. Wilson
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU
P. 0. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Max Rabner
BTS Investments
750 North 200 West, Suite 101
Provo, UT 84601
Gary L. Gregerson
Provo City Attorney
P. O. Box 1849
Provo, UT 84601
Louis Crandall
275 East Center Street
Provo, Utah 84606
Brent McQuarrie
34 South 300 East
Provo, Utah 84606
Bryan Ferre
402 East 620 South
Salem, Utah 84651
David 0. Jeffs
90 North 100 East
Provo, Utah 84606
Gary Brinton
Princeton Place, L.C.
1014 East 2620 North
Provo, Utah 84604

l223CB.ar+mm
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Exhibit "k" to Ord€
SAIC B a n Property and Excess i-and
The following real property located in the City of Provo, County
of Utan, State of Utah, described as follows:

Beginning at the East end of the South line of 3 00 North Street, Provo,
Utah, said point being located South 738.84 feet and East 80.62 feet and
South 89° 31' 36" East 998.04 feet from the West one-quarter corner of
Section 5, Township 7 South, Range 3 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian;
thence North 00° 08' 00" West 43.42 feet to the East end of the North
line of said 300 North Street; thence South 89° 30' 30" East along the
projected North line of said 3 00 North Street 505.62 feet to the West
bank of the Upper East Union Canal; thence Southerly along the Westerly
bank of said canal the following four (4) courses: South 33° 34' 00"
West 50.39 feet and South 08° 43' 30" West 232.11 feet and South 06° 12'
30" East 136.42 feet; thence South 68° 36' 31" West 154.60 feet; thence
South 21° 23' 29" East 30.90 feet; thence South 00° 44' 21" West 50.00
feet; thence North 89° 15' 39" West 171.94 feet to the East bank of the
Lower East Union Canal; thence North 19° 50' 00" West 195.49 feet along
said canal bank; thence North 19° 24' 54" West 159.62 feet along said
canal bank; thence North 15° 36' 27" West 119.48 feet; thence North 00°
08' 00" West 51.81 feet to the point of beginning.
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